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WRONGFUL DEATH
FREDERICK DAVIS*
The average person would think it ridiculous to question the right of
a widow to recover damages from a person whose irresponsible con-
duct had caused the death of her husband. After all, if the man had
lived he would have been able to sue for his personal injuries. One needs
only some common sense to conclude that, when a husband dies, the
wife should be able to recover for her loss.
In fact, this is the way the law began.1 Scholars have pointed out
that under early Saxon law a person responsible for the death of another
was required to pay wergild as compensation to those deprived of the
deceased's support.'
The matter became confused, however, when it was decided to make
killing a crime as well as a tort. Under English law, the killing of one
of the Crown's subjects was made such a grievous offense against the
Crown that all of the assets of the person responsible for such an out-
rage escheated to the Crown.' In such an "assetless" condition the de-
fendant was hardly worth suing. On top of this, the English law de-
veloped something called a "merger doctrine," which seemed to declare
* Edward W. Hinton Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
&A., 1948, Yale University; J.D. with specialization in international affairs, 1953,
Cornell University; LL.M. (honours), 1954, Victoria University of Wellington
(N.Z.). Member, New York and Missouri Bars.
1. See Hay, Death as a Civil Cause of Action in Massachusetts, 7 HAv. L.
REV. 170, 171 (1893).
2. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 46 (2d ed. reissued
1968). The very early common law obligation to pay some compensation to the
relatives of the deceased victim of a wrongful act appears to have developed from an
official condonation of the practice of "buying off" those capable of exercising the
prerogative of revenge. T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAv
425 (5th ed. 1956). A good summary of the various histories and explanations is
found in Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND.
L. REV. 605 (1960).
3. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DEATH 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
SPEISER] (collecting authorities). Contra, Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 50
N.J.L. 317, 318, 13 A. 233, 234 (1888) (pointing out that forfeiture of the assets of
a person responsible for death ensued only in certain types of deaths and that, how-
ever logical it is to assume that forfeiture of assets explains the prohibition of a
civil action, the case law does not support it).
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that a person who caused the death of another was so reprehensible
that the tort merged with the felony.4 The implication was that the
Crown's interest in revenge was preemptive, and the prerogative to
seek such revenge was reserved exclusively for the Crown. The situa-
tion was not unlike that which occasionally plagues a litigant today
when he brings suit for private damages against an entity subject to gov-
ernment regulation. Such a litigant may be barred by the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, a judicial principle which suspends the pursuit of
an otherwise vested private remedy on the theory that the pursuit of that
remedy may upset a legislative system of regulation.5 Labor lawyers
also will recognize an analogy in the preemptive theory of the National
Labor Relations Act, which bars private tort claims which would oth-
erwise be actionable."
As to damage actions for death, it is surprising that the gradual de-
struction of a right of action should have occasioned so little comment or
criticism, but few voices appear to have been raised in any protest. In
1808 the final annihilation of the right of action was made explicit in
the English case of Baker v. Bolton.7  In that decision Lord Ellen-
borough ruled that no action could be maintained at common law for
wrongful death. As was true of the decision holding a charity immune
from liability in tort, the opinion was probably bad law," but, as in the
case of the charitable immunity doctrine, that did not prevent the im-
portation of the opinion's holding into the United States, where it spread
like the dutch elm disease.'
4. The leading case cited by all discussions of the problem is Higgins v.
Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607), but there are other examples of the merger
doctrine collected in Smedley, supra note 2, at 611-13.
5. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 121 (1965);
Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315
(1956).
6. A leading case on the preemption doctrine of the National Labor Relations
Act is San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For excel-
lent updatings on the status of the preemption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Pre-
emption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsid-
ered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 469 (1972).
7. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). The literature on the case of Baker v.
Bolton is extensive. See Smedley, supra note 2, at 613-19.
8. Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv. 431
(1916).
9. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1067-
71 (1965). But see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
overruling earlier precedent and recognizing a "general maritime" and non-statu-
tory remedy for wrongful death. Massachusetts has recently followed that case and
[Vol. 1973:327
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CONTEMPORARY LAW
The reaction to Baker v. Bolton'0 generated in England the now fa-
mous Lord Campbell's Act, which, in general, permits the personal rep-
resentative of the deceased to bring an action to recover damages on be-
half of those persons suffering injuries as a result of the death of the
deceased by the defendant's wrongful act."' Although the overwhelm-
ing majority of statutes enacted in the various states used Lord Camp-
bell's Act as a model, the variations in language and in the interpreta-
tions given to these various statutes leave few threads of consistency or
uniformity.
As a matter of historical fact, little need existed in most American
jurisdictions for wrongful death statutes. A number of colonial deci-
sions, following the traditional common law, permitted recoveries for
wrongful death,12 and a few post-American Revolution decisions sup-
port the notion that a common law action for wrongful death was main-
tainable in most American state courts.'" Unfortunately, however, the
heresy of Baker v. Bolton"4 was uncritically accepted in almost all
states. Of all American jurisdictions, only Hawaii and Massachusetts
appear to have recognized a common law action for wrongful death,
but even in those jurisdictions the action is statutory.5
Although a wide variety of statutes exists today with very little in the
way of unifying decisional law, trends, or general rules of authority,
recognized that the action for death has a common law and not a statutory origin.
Gaudette v. Webb, - Mass. -, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (1972). For a discussion of
the rise and fall of the erroneous doctrine of charitable immunity, see Davis, The
Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 25 J. Mo. BAR 350 (1969).
10. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
I1. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
12. The pre-revolutionary decisions permitting recovery for wrongful death are
collected in SPsER 7-8.
13. The post-revolutionary decisions permitting recovery for wrongful death on
a common law basis are collected and discussed in Malone, The Genesis of Wrong-
ful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1066-67 (1967).
14. For a discussion offering theories to explain the uncritical acceptance of the
rationale of Baker v. Bolton in the United States, see Miller, Dead Men in Torts:
Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough, 19 CAm. U.L. REv. 283, 289-91 (1970).
15. An early Hawaiian case rejecting the rule in Baker v. Bolton is Kake v.
C.S, Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860). Hawaii has a liberal wrongful death statute,
based upon the theory of the original Lord Campbell's Act. HAwA Rnv. STAT.
. 663-3 (1968). But it has been held that the common law action for wrongful
death has been "merged" with the statutory action. Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd.,
45 Hawaii 443, 369 P.2d 96 (1962). See note 9 supra.
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it is possible to classify the various wrongful death statutes into three
general categories:
(1) the "Lord Campbell" type of statute, which creates a new cause
of action in or on behalf of named beneficiaries for the losses they
have sustained as a result of the wrongful death of their de-
ceased;1 6
(2) the so-called "loss to the estate" type of action, which tends to as-
sign an economic value to the life span of any given individual
based upon a demonstrable capacity of such individual to pro-
duce income, and to award damages roughly based upon the net
gain which will never be realized as a result of the premature de-
struction of the economically productive unit;' 7
(3) the "punitive" type of action, which permits the recovery of damages
as a substitute for a "fine" or "penalty," and which is therefore
neither geared to the decedent's capacity to produce nor to the ac-
tual economic loss suffered by those dependent upon him for sup-
port.18
In recent years states burdened with the loss to the estate type of ac-
tion have tended either to soften its absurd results by judicial decision,
or to repudiate it in its entirety.' 9 Although variants of the punitive type
16. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93. Most jurisdictions follow
the theory of the English statute by clearly indicating that the action is for the
losses sustained by those dependent upon the deceased. See, e.g., Mo. Rv. STAT.
§ 537.080 (1969).
17. Three state statutes which exemplify the so-called "loss to the estate" theory
of damages for wrongful death are CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (Supp. 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (Supp. 1972); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 556:12,
556:13 (Supp. 1971). One disability encountered in jurisdictions following a "loss
to the estate" theory of damages for wrongful death is the possibility, which can be
disastrous, of having the award considered subject to federal estate taxes on the de-
ceased's estate. See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 330 F. Supp.
999 (D. Conn. 1971).
18. See SPEISER 71-74.
19. McCoy v. Raucci, 156 Conn. 115, 239 A.2d 689 (1968) (recovery of
damages authorized when deceased was 74 years old); Mickel v. New England Coal
& Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 47 A.2d 187 (1946) (earning capacity and not net
savings for the estate is the proper element of damage). Iowa appears to be adher-
ing to the doctrinal statement that the damages in wrongful death are limited to the
net loss to the estate of savings which the deceased might have been able to accumu-
late, reduced to present worth. See Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 1152, 1157,
147 N.W.2d 188, 191 (1966). But the Iowa bark appears much worse than the
actual bite. See Marean v. Petersen, 259 Iowa 557, 570, 144 NAV.2d 906, 914
(1966) (appellate courts will not invade the province of the jury, will not compare
verdicts, and will take judicial notice of decreasing purchasing power of dollar)
($11,000 for death of 17 year old boy not out of line); Soreide v. Vilas & Co.,
[Vol. 1973:327
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of death statute existed in some jurisdictions during the earlier years of
the twentieth century (at times co-existing with compensatory or Lord
Campbell statutes), only two jurisdicions, Massachusetts and Ala-
bama, retain statutes of this type today.20
Thus the overwhelming majority of the states have wrongful death
statutes patterned after the Lord Campbell type, although the differ-
ences, inter sese, are so numerous that they defy analytical classifica-
tion.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTES
A clear understanding of the ways in which the various wrongful
death statutes affect the opportunities of wrongful death plaintiffs can-
not be acquired without a differentiation between wrongful death stat-
utes and survival statutes. The difference is not fully understood by
too many lawyers, and even judges have created unnecessary confusion
by failing to recognize the distinction. 21  The problem is further com-
247 Iowa 1139, 78 N.W.2d 41 (1956) ($50,000 reduced on remittitur to $37,500
for 33 year old service station attendant.) Note also IowA R. Crv. P. 8 (1951),
which allows a parent to recover for the loss of services sustained as a result of the
death of a minor child. See Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa
1971). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has declared that whether there is
any incremental savings loss to the estate of a 13 year old deaf mute with cerebral
palsy is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury under appropriate instruc-
tions." Pierce v. Mowry, 105 N.H. 428, 431, 201 A.2d 901, 904 (1964). Before
assuming that New Hampshire is as liberal as Iowa about affirming jury verdicts
apparently out of harmony with the "loss to the estate" rule, one should consider
how the New Hampshire Supreme Court follows its own rule. After the trier
of fact found that the loss to the estate was $6,581, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire took its own look at the facts and cut the recovery to $3,581. Pierce v.
Mowry, 106 N.H. 306, 210 A.2d 484 (1965).
20. The Massachusetts statutes on wrongful death constitute a complex universe
beyond capture in a single footnote, however erudite. For a summary, see SParSER
822-32. The provision most closely corresponding with the normal wrongful death
provision is MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1972), which explicitly
provides that the damages, within the limits established, are "to be assessed with
reference to the degree of culpability." The Alabama statute is not explicit on the
point, but leaves the matter to the jury. ALA. CoDE tit. 7, §§ 119, 123 (1960).
The penal quality of the Alabama statute is entirely attributable to judicial construe-
tion. Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1958).
But, in a long and exhaustive opinion in what apparently was a hotly contested
case, the Alabama Supreme Court (Chief Justice Heflin dissenting in a special opin-
ion) held that circumstances relevant to the pecuniary loss could be asserted as a
plea "in bar" directed toward the issue of the standing of the plaintiff to maintain
the action. Crenshaw v. Alabama Freight, Inc., 287 Ala. 372, 252 So. 2d 33 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N.W. 198
(1925). For an accurate, readable and well-documented explanation of the differ-
Vol. 1973:3271
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plicated by statutes which occasionally blend elements of wrongful
death with survival, or permit survival damages to be recovered in the
main wrongful death action.22
Technically speaking, the wrongful death action is an entirely new
cause of action independent from anything which the deceased had or
would have had. Its purpose is to provide compensation to those
who have been deprived of a relationship. Furthermore, by adding a ju-
dicial gloss to wordings which are arguably not so limited, a number
of jurisdictions have limited the wrongful death recovery to the so-called
"pecuniary loss" which those whom the statute was intended to bene-
fit have suffered.
The wrongful death action is occasionally characterized as "deriva-
tive," but that description is inaccurate.23 A derivative suit is typi-
cally brought by a plaintiff whose standing is only nominal, and when
the primary obligation sought to be enforced is owed by the defendant
to a third party or entity on whose behalf the nominal plaintiff brings
the action. 24  In such actions the nominal plaintiff may have an inci-
dental or derivative interest in the outcome of the action, but the theory
of the derivative suit is that the main obligation is owed to a person or
entity other than the party who initiates the action." The sharehold-
er's corporate derivative suit, brought against officers and directors for
wrongs against the corporation, is the primary example of the true deriv-
ative action, 26 but there are other examples, such as the individual's
action to abate a public nuisance.27 The whole system of extraordinary
ence between a "survival" action and an action for wrongful death, see Rohlfing v.
Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 443, 369 P.2d 96 (1962).
22. A jurisdiction which exemplifies the practice of awarding both survival
damages and wrongful death damages in the same action is Michigan. See, e.g.,
MICH. Com. LAws ANN. § 27A.2922 (Supp. 1972). Other jurisdictions are dis-
cussed in SPEisER 747-50.
23. E.g., Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964). See also Fenster v.
Gulf States Ceramic, 124 Ga. App. 102, 107, 182 S.E.2d 905, 909 (1971) (consor-
tium action by wife against employer not barred by workmen's compensation law,
but death action is barred because "derivative.").
24. R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 601-604
(3d abr. ed. 1959), contains as complete and concise a definition of the derivative
suit as can be found.
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1956) (derivative suit de-
scribed in dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
26. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Studley, 452 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1970); 38 CORNELL L.Q.
244 (1953).
27. See, e.g., Ravndal and Ravndal v. Nortbfork Placers, 60 Idaho 305, 91 P.2d
368 (1939); The Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. McConnell, 241 Mo. App. 223, 236 S.W.
2d 384 (1951).
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remedies or prerogative writs is based upon a derivative theory,28
as is the so-called "private attorney-general" theory of Judge Frank,
which enlarged the constitutionally permissible scope of those having
standing to challenge governmental actions. 29
The wrongful death action is not such a suit. It is brought solely for
the direct injuries sustained by those dependent upon the deceased to
some degree. While it is true that under the original Lord Campbell's
Act, and in many jurisdictions today, the action is brought by the per-
sonal representative of the estate of the deceased, that fact does not make
the action a derivative one in the true sense of the word. A better way
to characterize the action for wrongful death is to speak of it as a "re-
lational" action-a lawsuit brought to redress an injury inflicted upon
the plaintiff and involving an interference with a relationship.
The survival action, on the other hand, is simply a continuation of the
action which the deceased would have been bringing were he not dead."
It is brought, whenever possible, to recover for impairment of earning
capacity, medical and hospital expenses, pain and suffering and other
general damages which the deceased may have suffered between the
time of injury and the time of death."
At the time most wrongful death statutes were being enacted, the gen-
eral common law rule prevailed to the effect that an action for personal
injuries abated upon the death of either party.32  For this reason the
28. See Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Ac-
tion by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 33 MINN. L. REv. 569,
576-79 (1949).
29. Associated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.),
rcv'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). For a good discussion of the whole
problem of the derivative nature of the private action against an alleged abuse of
governmental power, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
516-21 (1965).
30. An elaborate discussion of the distinction between the survival action and the
action for wrongful death can be found in both the majority and concurring opinions in
Rohifing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1961). See also
Douchette v. Bouchard, 28 Conn. Supp. 460, 265 A.2d 618 (Super. Ct. 1970); cf.
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
31. For a decision in which the equities favored allowing recovery to an un-
emancipated minor for the damages sustained by his deceased father, but in which
the court was at pains to point out that the damages sustained by the deceased be-
tween the time of injury and the time of death can be allocated only to the estate
of the deceased, see Smith v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825 (1952).
32. The Latin formulation of the rather unusual rule that tort actions die with
the victim or with the tortfeasor is the much quoted quia actio personalis moritur
cui persona. An erudite discussion of the rule can be found in Winfield, Death as
Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 239, 244-50 (1929).
Vol. 1973:3271
Washington University Open Scholarship
334 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
drafters of the wrongful death statutes may be excused for failing to
foresee and to guard against the confusion which would result when this
common law rule was changed.
A majority of the states allow, with varying degrees of permissiveness,
the recovery of both survival damages and relational damages from the
tortfeasor 3  Some permit two actions to be maintained while others ef-
fect what amounts to a joinder or merger of the two types of actions.
Missouri is a significant exception. The Missouri statute explicitly con-
ditions the survival of an action for personal injuries on the death of
the decedent from some cause other than the defendant's negligent or
wrongful act.8 4 Thus the Missouri policy, which is illogical, is to make
the actions mutually exclusive. Two examples will help to illustrate this
point:
Example 1: X is seriously injured in an accident attributable to the de-
fendant's negligence. He spends 18 months in the hospital and incurs
earnings losses of $30,000, medical and hospital expenses of $10,000
and general damages of $60,000. Before he files suit against the de-
fendant, however, he dies from the injuries. While X's wife has an ac-
tion against the defendant for wrongful death, she can recover only her
pecuniary losses up to the $50,000 limitation. X's personal represen-
tative recovers nothing.35
Example 2: Same facts as in Example 1 except that X, rather than dy-
ing, is discharged from the hospital but is killed by lightning while
golfing. X's personal representative has an action against the de-
33. See Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful
Death-A Survey and A Proposal, 16 TuL. L. REv. 386, 391 (1942). The area
has always been one of immeasurable confusion. In 1942, a special committee un-
der the chairmanship of Dean Paul Brosman of the Tulane University School of
Law submitted the draft of a Uniform Act on Survival of Tort Actions and Death by
Wrongful Act to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52D ANNUAL CONFERENCE 228 et seq. (1942).
The Act would have unified and rationalized the confusing melange which then ex-
isted and which survives to this day, but the Act was later withdrawn from consid-
eration by the Conference. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGs oF TIE 53D ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE 56 (1943).
34. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.020 (1969).
35. The law supporting Example 1 is clearly established by the peculiar lan-
guage of Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 537.020 (1969) (". . . other than those resulting in
death . . ." [emphasis added]) and the language in the following decisions: Plaza
Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 172-73, 280 S.W.2d 17, 22 (1955); Bay-
singer v. Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 1046, 199 S.W.2d 644, 647 (1947).
[V/ol. 1973:327
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fendant for all medical and hospital expenses, earnings losses and gen-
eral damages sustained by X between the time of injury and the time of
death. X's widow has no action for wrongful death.36
Although not employing the same statutory language, at least five
other states do not permit the recovery of survival damages in the situa-
tion when the injured party dies from the injury inflicted.37 In four
other jurisdictions no statutory provision is made for the survival of neg-
ligence actions, so that only the relational damages for wrongful death
can be recovered in those states.3 - In at least twenty-five percent of
the American jurisdictions, all of the damages which a deceased sustained
between the time of injury and the time of death may not be recovered
from the tortfeasor whose negligently inflicted injury caused the death.
In some jurisdictions, by statute or by judicial interpretation, some of
the damages which would normally be a part of the survival action can
be recovered by the statutory beneficiary in the wrongful death case. For
example, in Missouri a husband in an action for the wrongful death
of his wife may recover her medical and hospital expenses attributable
to the defendant's wrongful act and incurred between the time of injury
and the time of death.39
36. Harris v. Goggins, 374 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1963); Longan v. Kansas City Rys.
Co, 299 Mo. 561, 253 S.W. 758 (1923).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-403 (Supp. 1966); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 27A.-
2921 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.100 (1966);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-8 (1966).
38. SPEISER 745.
39. Wilt v. Moody, 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953). Funeral expenses are not
logically allocable to either the survival or the wrongful death claim because all
the wrongdoer has done has been to accelerate the time for the payment of what is
inevitable. See J. MTmO'D, The American Way of Death (1963). The rule of
Wilt v. Moody, which allows the husband to recover both the medical and hospital
expenses as well as the funeral expenses of the deceased wife in a Lord Campbell
type action for wrongful death is apparently based upon the theory that he is legally
obligated to assume such expenses. MissouRi APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTONS No.
5.05 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MAI]. The foregoing inference is based
upon the fact that the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions do not permit such
damages to be sought when the action is for the wrongful death of a child, MAI No.
5.03; for the death of a husband, MAI No. 5.02; for the death of a parent, MAI No.
5.09, or in the personal representative's action on behalf of the heirs, MAI No. 5.07.
However, where it is alleged that the plaintiff paid the funeral expenses in order to
prevent their being a charge against the public, they seem to be recoverable. Caen
v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1963). Accord, Robinson v. Richardson, 484 S.W.2d
27 (Mo. App. 1972). But see Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601, 613-14 (Mo.
App. 1960), in which the funeral expenses incurred by the parents in connection
with the wrongful death of a child were permitted to be recovered under broad
Washington University Open Scholarship
336 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The significance of this can be appreciated by considering cases in
which large recoveries have been authorized for pain and suffering en-
dured by the deceased between the time of injury and the time of death,
even in situations when the interval of survival was relatively short.40
In jurisdictions such as Missouri, which deny the maintenance of sur-
vival actions under those circumstances, such recoveries are forever lost.
Setting aside, for the moment, further consideration of the survival
action, attention will be given to a number of perplexing problems which
the conventional Lord Campbell type of relational damages action for
wrongful death presents.
WHO CAN SUE?
A problem common to all jurisdictions is identifying the person or
persons having capacity to sue for wrongful death. The problem is par-
ticularly perplexing in those jurisdictions having variants of the Lord
Campbell model.
As noted earlier, the action for wrongful death is normally a relational
action-that is, an action based upon a direct interference with a rela-
tionship advantageous to the plaintiff. The action for wrongful death
is not the only such relational action recognized by the law. Actions
for loss of services, 41 interference with contract,42 enticement away of
servants or services43 and loss of consortium44 are common examples.
In the typical relational action the plaintiff sues in his own right for
relational injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's actions
against or involving a third person. 45
language which makes no allusion to the parents' legal responsibility, if any, or to
the absence of any estate which would otherwise require burial at public expense.
40. E.g., Caldecott v. Long Island Lighting Co., 298 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), awarding $50,000 for excruciating pain suffered during short interval before
death by carbon monoxide poisoning, but later reduced, on remittitur, to $10,000,
417 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1969).
41. Injury to a minor gives rise to two causes of action, one of which is for the
minor, and the other of which is for the loss of services etc. sustained by the parents,
although it is possible for all elements of damages to be recovered in one action by
the minor where his parent brings the action as his duly appointed guardian and
curator. See, e.g., Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959).
42. See, e.g., Coonis v. Rogers, 429 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. 1968).
43. See Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. App. 1971); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 929 (4th ed. 1971).
44. See Blandford v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 199 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. App. 1947);
L. GREEN, W. PDRaucK, J. RAnL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINs & A. SMITH, INJURIES TO
RELATIONS 243 et seq. (1968).
45. L. GREEN, supra note 44, at ix.
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In most relational actions (other than those for alienation of affection4"
or wrongful death) little trouble is encountered in determining who can
bring the action. Thus, in the consortium action, it is the actual spouse.
In the enticement action, it is the previous employer.4 7  So also in
the contractual interference cases, the persons suffering the relational
damages are rarely more than one, and even when multiple, they are
easily identified.48
The wrongful death action presents other problems. In the normal
situation there are multiple dependents aggrieved by the defendant's
death-producing wrongful act. The wife and children of the deceased
are the most obvious, but in many situations the parent or parents of the
deceased have suffered a demonstrable economic and emotional loss.
Moreover, in many cases the degree of loss varies appreciably from in-
dividual to individual, depending upon the circumstances.
Example 3: Deceased was divorced from his first wife and making
child support payments for the three minor children by the first wife.
He has two additional minor children by his second wife. The second
wife of the deceased is an heiress with more than enough income to
support herself and her two children. The first wife has no independ-
ent means. The first wife and minor children thereof are the seri-
ously aggrieved persons, but in many jurisdictions they may not receive
damages commensurate to their losses.
Example 4: Deceased was married with no children. His wife's par-
ents are deceased, but he was contributing substantial support to his own
parents. His wife works and is earning a substantial income. The par-
ents are the truly aggrieved parties but they may not be entitled to sue
and may not recover anything in many jurisdictions.
It can be seen from the foregoing examples that the wrongful death ac-
tion, because it is relational, presents three distinct and troublesome
problems which the statutory draftsman has not satisfactorily solved:
( I ) the type of relationship or dependency necessary in order to justify
46. In most jurisdictions the only person having standing to maintain the action
for alienation of affections is the aggrieved spouse. Comte v. Blessing, 381 S.W.2d
780 (Mo. 1964). A minority view would allow a child to bring the action, and in
jurisdictions following such a view problems can arise in connection with the dis-
tribution of damages among multiple parties, all of whom are aggrieved by the same
at. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). See also Nocca, Should a
Child Have a Right of Action Against a Third Person Who Has Enticed One of His
Parents Away from the Home, 2 N.Y.L. FORUM 357 (1956).
47, Ste, e.g., Anderson v. Moskovitz, 260 Mass. 523, 157 N.E. 601 (1927).
48. See, e.g., Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
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holding the defendant liable for the aggrievement consequentially
inflicted (basically a question of "proximate cause");
(2) the person or persons who have "standing" to bring the action; and
(3) when there are multiple beneficiaries, apportioning the award in
accordance with the relative needs of the beneficiaries.
The original approach to the problem was both simple and direct:
the personal representative of the deceased brought the action on be-
half of certain beneficiaries designated by statute, and the award was
apportioned as the trier of facts found and directed.49 In this situation
it was typically contemplated that the personal representative would
act as a "trustee" for the designated beneficiaries, and the award was
generally considered to be beyond the reach of the creditors of the es-
tate.50
This approach, derived from the fundamental English statute, ap-
parently remains the pattern in the majority of American jurisdictions
today. Nevertheless, many variations from this pattern exist, all of
which give the cause of action to someone other than the personal repre-
sentative. It is not altogether clear what policy considerations dic-
tated a departure from the traditional approach, but one can guess that
there were misgivings concerning the vigor with which the personal rep-
resentative and his attorney (normally a lawyer concerned with trusts
and estates but not with personal injury actions) would press the tort
claim. A more cynical explanation would attribute the changes to the
so-called "personal injury bar," victorious in its campaign to get this
"business." Whatever the reason for the changes, however, they have
taken place in a number of jurisdictions, and in every case the three
problems mentioned above, which were so simply and directly dis-
posed of by the original Lord Campbell's Act, have become more com-
plicated.
In this respect the Missouri experience is typical. The present Mis-
souri statute provides for a system of sequential "appropriation" by
classes of dependents.5 1 The spouse or minor children may bring the ac-
tion "within one year after such death." If they fail to bring the ac-
tion within that year, the parent or parents of the deceased may bring
the action, and if there are no parents, then the personal representative
49. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93.
50. Dukes v. Dukes, 233 Ark. 850, 349 S.W.2d 339 (1961); State v. Cambria,
137 Conn. 604, 80 A.2d 516 (1951).
51. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 537.080(1)-(3) (1969).
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may bring the action, with, in the latter case, the proceeds being dis-
tributed in accordance with the laws of descent.
Although the system appears reasonable in the abstract, in practice
it generates maddening perplexities and uncertainties, all of which make
the settlement of wrongful death claims virtually impossible in all but
the simplest type of case. A few examples will illustrate this:
Example 5: At the time of his death, deceased was separated from his
wife and had custody of three minor children who were being cared for
by the widowed mother of the deceased. The mother is estranged from
the children. If the defendant wishes to settle, he must secure a recon-
ciliation of conflicting claims. The children's duly appointed "guard-
ian" may join in any action, but the persons on whose behalf he appears
have interests hostile to his co-plaintiff.
Example 6: Deceased, who was unmarried and 30 years of age at the
time of his death resulting from defendant's wrongful act, provided the
only support for his aged parents. Under one interpretation of the Mis-
souri statute, the parents can sue for the wrongful death. Under an-
other equally persuasive interpretation, the personal representative
must bring the action.52
Example 7: Deceased's widow, on behalf of herself and her two minor
children, brings an action against D for the wrongful death. D's insurer
settles the case for $10,000 and obtains a release. Despite the fact that
deceased's widow had satisfied the court that she had ". . . dili-
gently attempted to notify all parties having a cause of action under this
subdivision," a child by a former, but undisclosed, marriage of the
deceased files a subsequent claim within the period of limitation.
D's insurer may have to pay again.
Example 8: The parents of a 35 year old bachelor are killed as a re-
sult of the wrongful act of D. Even though the bachelor is the only
person aggrieved by the wrongful death, the death action must, under
the Missouri statute, be brought by the personal representative.5 3
Example 9: Deceased dies as a result of the defendant's wrongful act
and is survived by a widow but no children or parents. The widow
brings an action against D 14 months after the death of the deceased.
Even though the statute requires the action to be brought within 2 years
after the cause of action accrues, the widow's claim is barred.
52, See text accompanying notes 66 and 67 infra.
53. The Missouri statute limits the action to minor children. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.080(1) (1969). Hence, the action for the death of parents of an adult
child must be brought by the personal representative. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(3)
(1969).
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An additional problem involves the third point mentioned above;
namely, the apportionment of damages among beneficiaries with vary-
ing degrees of need and aggrievement. In Missouri, for example, the
concurrent negligence of one of the wrongful death beneficiaries does
not necessarily bar the action, although the contributory negligence of
the deceased will bar it.
Example 10: Plaintiff's deceased is killed at a railway crossing as a di-
rect result of the defendant's negligence in the operation of its railway
train. Deceased was driving a car and had a clear view of the track
and of the approaching train. Plaintiff's widow has no action for wrong-
ful death because of the contributory negligence of the deceased.54
Example 11: Plaintiff's deceased was a passenger in a vehicle being
driven by deceased's minor daughter when the vehicle was struck at a
railway crossing by defendant's negligently operated railway train. De-
ceased's minor daughter was also negligent in failing to maintain a proper
lookout, and, as a direct result of both negligent acts, deceased was
killed and deceased's minor daughter sustained personal injuries. The
daughter may not recover damages from the railroad company because
of her own contributory negligence. Plaintiff, who is the widow of the
deceased, may nevertheless recover from the railroad company for the
wrongful death of her husband even though the grant of damages will
result in benefits to the minor daughter, who is technically a joint tort-
feasor.55
Example 12: A widower with three minor children is killed as a direct re-
sult of the defendant's wrongful act. One child is 18 years of age
and earns $30,000 a year as a nationally recognized folk-singer and
television personality. A second child, aged 16, is a high school
student. A third child, aged 10, has rheumatoid arthritis and needs a
good deal of medical attention and care. Under the original plan of
Lord Campbell's Act, the personal representative brought the suit, but
the allocation of the award between the multiple beneficiaries was made
by the trier of the facts (the jury, or when the jury is waived, by the
judge as the fact trier). In states such as Missouri, however, the distri-
bution of the award is apportioned by the judge.56
Several difficulties are presented by the situation in which there are
multiple beneficiaries. Even when the jury apportions the award, there
54. Davenport v. Wabash R.R., 435 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1968).
55. Results in example supported by rules declared in Reynolds v. Thompson,
215 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1948); Herrell v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d
102 (1929).
56. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.095(4) (1969).
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is the argument that the competing claimants are adverse to each other
and should be represented independently.5 7  Whether the responsibil-
ity be confined to judge or jury there is the problem of what stand-
ards and criteria to weigh and consider in making the apportionment.
Moreover, it is possible to argue that the prerogative of independent
counsel in the allocation process may be constitutionally entrenched.5"
Where, as in Missouri, the division of the award among beneficiaries
having competing interests is made by the court, there is the additional
problem of whether a constitutional right to a jury trial has been in-
fringed."I
Mention has been made of the perplexities and uncertainties en-
countered under the Missouri wrongful death statute. Two of these, as
illustrated by Examples 6 and 8 above, require special mention. The
first is when an adult child is dependent upon the support of a sole
surviving parent who is killed, or upon parents with no other children and
the parents are killed simultaneously as a result of the defendant's
wrongful act. The damages law of Missouri allows a minor to recover
only support lost from a wrongfully killed parent during the period
of minority." This suggests that an adult child suffers no pecuniary
loss. But the case law is clear that when an adult child does suffer
a pecuniary loss as a result of the death of his parent, he can recover
damages." Paradoxically, however, in such a situation the action must
be brought by the personal representative rather than by the person
actually suffering the pecuniary loss. 62 This is because Missouri Revised
Statute section 537.080 authorizes direct recovery only by the spouse,
minor children, or a parent. Absent any of those, the action must be
maintained by the personal representative. Moreover, in such a case
the statute orders the proceeds of the recovery to be "distributed accord-
ing to the laws of descent," which, if literally interpreted, would allow
57. See generally 23 J. Mo. BAR 543, 566 (1967).
58, Id.
59. The constitutionality of the statutory provision authorizing judicial apportion-
ment of a wrongful death award between competing beneficiaries in a single death
action was challenged in Grothe v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 460 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1970),
but the validity of the challenge could not be considered by virtue of the absence of
sufficient aggrievement giving the defendant standing to address such a challenge.
60. Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920
(1933); McPherson v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry., 97 Mo. 253, 10 S.W. 846 (1889).
61. Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1962); Domijan v. Harp,
340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960).
62. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(3) (1969).
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"laughing heirs" to preempt the deserving adult child. 3  On the other
hand, that provision is in direct conflict with another provision of the
statute which requires the victorious plaintiff in a wrongful death
action "[t]o distribute the net proceeds as ordered by the court.10 4
Because the more specific provision is likely to prevail over the more
general, the possibilities are that in a litigated case the "laughing heir"
will prevail. 5
Even more incongruous is the situation in which a parent or parents
suffer the death of an adult child upon whom he, she or they depend
for support. Again, the case law is clear that in such situations the
parent or parents may recover for the wrongful death of the adult un-
married child if they have in fact sustained a pecuniary loss. 0 But the
statute is not at all clear as to whether, in such a case, the action is to
be brought by the parental plaintiff or by the personal representa-
tive. Missouri Revised Statute section 537.080(2) provides that the
action may be brought "by the father and mother, natural or adoptive,"
in those situations when there is "no spouse or minor children, or if the
spouse or minor children fail to sue within one year after such death."
So far it would seem that if the deceased had no wife and no children,
then his parents obviously may sue. The ambiguity, however, results
from another alternative in the same sentence in the statute which al-
lows the parents to sue when "the deceased be a minor and unmar-
ried." This can be construed to be exclusive, and to eliminate re-
covery by the parents when the deceased is not a minor and is unmar-
ried, or it may be construed to grant a cause of action to the par-
ents in the limited situation in which the deceased is a minor who is un-
married and whose dependent children might otherwise have the action.
Between the two constructions, the second would be more logical
and would permit the parents to sue for the wrongful death of the adult
child. This is so because the provisions are alternative and, in the case
hypothesized, there is "no spouse or minor children." But one must then
consider Missouri Revised Statute section 537.080(3), which provides:
63. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(3) (1969). See Cavers, Change in the Ameri-
can Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IowA L. REa,. 203 (1934); 23 J. Mo. BAR
543, 566 (1967).
64. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.095 2(4) (1969).
65. See Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. 1968).
66. See, e.g., Hertz v. McDowell, 355 Mo. 383, 214 S.W.2d 546 (1948); Anderson
v. Robertson, 402 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. App. 1966).
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If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children, natural
born or adopted as herein indicated, or if the deceased be an unmarried
minor and there be no father or mother, then in such case suit may be
instituted and recovery had by the administrator or executor of the de-
ceased and the amount recovered shall be distributed according to the
laws of descent.
The ambiguity may not be apparent at first. Note, however, that the
first two clauses are alternative clauses. If the second alternative is
omitted, the statute reads:
If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children, natural
born or adopted as herein indicated. . then in such case suit may be in-
stituted and recovery had by the administrator or executor of the de-
ceased and the amount recovered shall be distributed according to the
laws of descent.
Since the unmarried adult child fits this category, and does not fit the
omitted alternative clause because he is not a minor, this can be read
as giving the cause of action to the personal representative, with the
"laughing heir" given the distinct possibility of scoring twice.
If the reader is inclined to think of this problem in terms of the spec-
ulations of an academic, let it be reported that the author has received
calls from practicing attorneys who found this ambiguity the only ob-
stacle to settlement of a case and who had hoped, unsuccessfully, that
the author was aware of an authoritative solution.67
DAMAGES
The language of the original Lord Campbell's Act was general with
respect to the issue of damages and allowed the jury to award "...
such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury. ' 68 Shortly
after its enactment, however, the statute was given an extremely re-
strictive interpretation which limited recovery under its provisions to
actual "pecuniary losses" sustained by the surviving beneficiaries.69 A
literal interpretation of the "pecuniary loss" rule results in the following
type of anomaly:
Example 13: An 18 year old honor student and Eagle Scout is killed as a
direct result of the negligence of the defendant. The deceased's par-
ents had predeceased him three years earlier, thereby making him the
sole surviving heir of two maternal grandparents. Because the
67. But see Rogers v. Fiandaca, 491 S.W.2d 560 (Mo. 1973).
68. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Viet., c. 93.
69. Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
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grandparents were not receiving any support from the deceased at the
time of his death, they sustain no "pecuniary loss" and the defendant is
not liable for any damages. 70
Not all states adhere to the pecuniary loss rule, even though, in a
particular case like Georgia, the state's statute is modeled after the orig-
inal Lord Campbell's Act. In that state, after a number of uncertain
decisions as to the appropriate measure of damages to be applied in
death cases,71 the courts finally settled on the proposition that the
measure of damages in each case must be left to "the enlightened
conscience of the jury. '72
As previously mentioned, a number of jurisdictions permit the re-
covery of "survival damages" along with a recovery for the losses di-
rectly sustained by the surviving beneficiaries under the wrongful death
act.7 3
Example 14: A husband is injured as a direct result of the defendant's
negligence. Following two years of hospitalization during which he su-
stains $60,000 loss of earnings, and $50,000 in general damages, the
husband dies. His wife and children thereby sustain additional dam-
ages for loss of support amounting to $50,000. Many jurisdictions in
this situation allow a full recovery of $160,000.
70. Facts for the example are suggested by the notorious case of Heath v. United
States, 85 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Ala. 1949), allowing, in a situation almost identical to
the facts in the example, damages of $1.00.
71. Compare Collins v. McPherson, 91 Ga. App. 347, 85 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1954),
and Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co. v. Thomas, 64 Ga. App. 253, 12 S.E.2d 494 (1940),
with T.D. Slater Contracting Co. v. Williams, 101 Ga. App. 549, 114 S.E.2d 448
(1960), and Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Bell, 100 Ga. App. 438, 111 S.E.2d 734
(1959). In the Slater case it was observed that it may be prejudicial error to use
the ritual phrase "enlightened conscience of the jury" too often in charging the jury
as to the proper measure of damages to be applied in a wrongful death case. It
was also emphasized that it may be error to employ the phrase "enlightened conscience
of the jury" without evidence as to the age, propensities, family circumstances etc., of
the child in question. See the ambiguous language of GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1308
(1968). Also see the ambiguities which prompted the certification of certain questions
to the Georgia Supreme Court in Bullock County Hosp. Auth. v. Fowler, 227 Ga. 638,
182 S.E.2d 493 (1971).
72. "In an action to recover for the wrongful death of a minor child, the measure
of damages 'is the full value of the life' of the child as found by the enlightened con-
science of the jury." Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Duncan, 123 Ga. App. 479,
181 S.E.2d 535, 538 (1971).
73. Michigan is one of the major jurisdictions which permits the recovery of
"survival" damages as part of the claim for wrongful death. MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27A.2922(1) (Sapp. 1972). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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It should be noted that the jurisdictions which permit recovery of
both "survival" and "death" damages as illustrated by Example 14 vary
considerably in the mechanics of recovery. Some require all dam-
ages to be recovered by the personal representative,74 while others al-
low the surviving beneficiary or beneficiaries to maintain the action.75
In some situations the personal representative may bring the survival ac-
tion with an independent action maintainable by the surviving bene-
ficiary.7" If the defendant happens to be the United States Government
it should be noted that the Federal Tort Claims Act follows state law on
the damages rule to be applied except in those states (Alabama and
Massachusetts) having wrongful death acts which are "penal" in char-
acter.77 In those jurisdictions the Act requires an "actual or compensa-
tory" damages rule to be followed. 7S
The Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) establishes the condi-
tions under which employees of common carriers by rail may recover
damages for injuries sustained in the course of employment.7 9  Under
its terms, both survival damages and death damages are recoverable in
a death action brought by the personal representative of the deceased.
Unique jury instructions are therefore required in those states whose
substantive law does not permit recoveries of both items."0 But the
Missouri Supreme Court recently qualified this liberal damages rule by
holding that in a death action under FELA, unless there is some per-
son actually in some way "dependent" upon the deceased, the "survi-
74, E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922 (Supp. 1972).
75. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (1971).
76. E.g., PA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1601-1604 (1950) (providing for action for wrongful
death by designated persons); PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 320.610 (1950) (providing for the
maintenance of survival action by personal representative). That the statutes deal with
two independent causes of action maintainable by independent parties is made clear by
the review of the law in Frankel v. Burke's Excavating, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 945 (E.D.
Pa, 1963). However, where both actions involve common questions of fact (which
they almost always do) provision is made for the consolidation of actions. PA. R. CIrv.
P. 213(e) (1971).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
78. Id. The penal character of the Massachusetts and Alabama statutes is well
known, but it is not so well known that the penal character of the Alabama statute is
from a judicial construction and not from the actual wording of the statute. Compare
MASS. GEN. Lkws ANN. ch. 299, § 2 (Supp. 1972), with ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 119, 123
(1958). See note 20 supra.
79. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 52 (1970).
80, Id. The survival action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is under
45 U.S.C. § 59 (1970). See MAI No. 8.01.
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val" damages sustained by the deceased (i.e. the deceased's actual medi-
cal and hospital expenses, loss of wages, and general damages endured
between the time of injury and the time of death) may not be recovered
under the Act.81
Subject to narrow exceptions to be discussed, a number of states do
not permit the damages which the deceased sustained before death to be
recovered in the wrongful death action. Missouri is such a jurisdic-
tion,"' but is also one of a handful of jurisdictions which continues to
impose a limitation or "lid" on the wrongful death recovery.83 Two
examples may help to illustrate the unfairness which such a combina-
tion of bad rules produces.
Example 15: A Granite City, Illinois, man is killed as a direct result of the
negligence of an employee of the federal government. He was 32
years old at the time of his death, industrious, and was establishing
a name for himself in the field of industrial computer processing. He
leaves a wife and three children under 10 years of age. He also sustained
general damages of about $10,000 between the time of injury and the
time of death. Since Illinois has no "lid" on recovery for wrongful
death, permits survival damages to be recovered in such an action, and
has a wrongful death statute which is not "penal" in nature, a substan-
tial recovery is not unlikely, and $200,000 is reasonable. The action
would be under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 84
Example 16: Same facts as in Example 15 except that the deceased and
his family are residents of University City, Missouri. Since Missouri
does not permit the recovery of survival damages under these circum-
81. Auld v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 463 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1970).
82. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.020, 537.090 (1969).
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1969) ($50,000 limit). Over the past six years
Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon and South Dakota have removed their limitations
on actions for wrongful death. This leaves, other than Missouri, only six jurisdictions
with an arbitrary limit on the amount recoverable: Kansas ($35,000); Massachusetts
($50,000); New Hampshire ($60,000); Wisconsin ($35,000); Virginia ($40,000);
and West Virginia ($110,000). S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 7.2
(Cum. Supp. 1972).
84. Illinois law applies to the death action against the federal government arising
out of an act in Illinois. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). There is no monetary limit to
the action for wrongful death in Illinois. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd,
Supp. 1972), Il. Laws 1967, p. 3227, § 1. Actions for personal injuries do not sur-
vive the death of the victim in Illinois, but the survival damages, if they consist of
medical and hospital expenses actually paid for by the beneficiary of the wrongful death
action, or if such beneficiary would be liable for them, may be recovered in the wrong-
ful death action. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
42 Ill. App. 2d 163, 191 N.E.2d 628 (1963).
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stances, and since Missouri has a $50,000 "lid" on recovery for wrong-
ful death, $50,000 is the maximum which the widow can recover from the
federal government.
A state such as Missouri may place a third limitation or discrimina-
tory condition upon the wrongful death claimant. It may, in addition
to placing a "lid" on the amount which may be recovered, and in addi-
tion to denying the recovery of what may be called "survival" dam-
ages, follow the general rule that recovery in a wrongful death action
may be only for the pecuniary losses sustained by the surviving bene-
ficiaries. The rule denies recovery for losses of consortium, companion-
ship, guidance and other such relational losses which in many cases
are the real losses visited upon the relatives of the deceased victim."8
The pecuniary loss rule has been characterized as barbarous. s 6 It
was never a part of the actual wording of the original Lord Camp-
bell's Act, and generally is not found in those statutes derived from
or based upon the English statute. It would appear to be nothing more
than a gratuitous and muddle-headed inference drawn by some mis-
guided nineteenth century judges.8 7 The false credentials of the pe-
cuniary loss rule were eloquently exposed for what they are by former
Professor Talbot Smith. As a state judge, former Professor Smith
wrote for a divided Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Wycko v.
Gnodtkess as follows:
The fiction now employed as the measure of pecuniary loss should be
abandoned. . . . The child is a person and is not to be read out of the
act by judicial acquiescence in the chief baron's theory that his life
has no pecuniary value save as that of a wage earner. The bloodless
bookkeeping imposed upon our juries by the savage exploitations of the
85. See Judge Holtzoff's realistic approach to the problem of compensating the
parents for the death of an infant in Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp.
792 (D.D.C. 1952). See also the provisions of the Hawaiian wrongful death statute,
which make elaborate provision for compensating losses of a non-pecuniary nature,
HAwAn REv. STAT. § 663-3 (1968).
86. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1960).
87. Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852). Very little attention
has been given to this remarkable judicial emasculation of a remedial statute. Dean
Prosser accounts for the decision in terms of a judicial "alarm" about the difficulty of
evaluating the damages. W. PROSSER, L.kw OF ToRTS § 121 (4th ed. 1971). Dean
Vernon X. Miller attributes the endurance of such incongruities to judicial laziness.
Miller, Dead Men iz Torts: Lord Campbell's Act Was Not Enough, 19 CArH. U.L.
R Ev. 283, 290 (1970) ("Judging is easier when magistrates can rely on legalisms and
precedents.").
88. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
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last century must no longer be perpetuated by our courts.8 9
Despite Missouri's continued adherence to the pecuniary loss rule, un-
der some circumstances the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated a
willingness to depart from its strict application. One basis upon which
the Missouri Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to depart from
the pecuniary loss rule is found in the Missouri statute which permits the
jury to take into account "the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the wrongful act, neglect or default resulting in such
death." 0  Although this concept of permitting the aggravating circum-
stances to be taken into account when awarding damages is directly
opposite to the pecuniary loss rule, the Missouri Supreme Court relied
upon the "aggravating circumstances" phrase in upholding a $25,000
verdict (the statutory maximum in force at the time of death) in the
case of a young man who suffered a particularly horrible death as a re-
sult of insecticide poisoning.91
It can be argued that the existence of "aggravating circumstances" of
such a nature which justify an award greater than the actual pecuniary
losses sustained is the same as allowing one to receive "punitive dam-
ages." Although this contention is technically correct, the courts have
insisted that the concepts are different, while conceding that in effect the
results are the same.92 Thus, if the degree of culpability of the de-
89. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 342, 105 N.W.2d 118, 124 (1960). The
appeal to reason in the opinion of Judge Talbot Smith has not been accepted in many
jurisdictions, and in Michigan, subsequent decisions have, in effect, repudiated Judge
Smith's call for an abandonment of the pecuniary loss rule by characterizing it as
dictum. See Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970);
Johnson, Wrongful Death and Intellectual Dishonesty, 16 S. DAK. L. REV. 36, 45 et seq.
(1971).
90. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1969).
91. Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1967). See also Hertz v. McDowell,
358 Mo. 383, 388, 214 S.W.2d 546, 550 (1948) ("pecuniary loss of every kind and char-
acter') (emphasis added); Nuckols v. Andrews Investment Co., 364 S.W.2d 128 (Mo.
App. 1962). Note, however, that in connection with the death of a minor the Missouri
law appears to permit the pecuniary loss recovery only for amounts which the minor
might have been expected to contribute during his minority. Brewer v. Rowe, 363
Mo. 592, 252 S.W.2d 372 (1952). This rule seems to conflict with those decisions
which permit the parents of an adult child to recover damages for the death of such
adult child. See note 66 supra and accompanying text. Although the case of a parent
continuing to receive support from an adult child can be distinguished as a special case.
When evidentiary submissions are made to indicate the parents' right to expect support
to continue past minority, damages may be awarded to compensate the parent for the
loss of such an expectancy. See Collins v. Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968).
92. See, e.g., May v. Bradford, 369 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1963).
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fendant satisfies any of the numerous but vague pejoratives listed by the
courts as a condition for the award of punitive damages,93 such dam-
ages may be given over and above the actual pecuniary loss, but must
be formally attributed to "aggravating circumstances" and not identi-
fied as "punitive damages." It is important to remember that even
though there be aggravating circumstances, the entire recovery may
still not exceed the statutory limit. In other words, damages based
upon aggravating circumstances can be used to make up the differ-
ence between the actual damages sustained and the statutory maxi-
mum, but not to exceed the statutory maximum.
The statutory language which permits a partial escape from the ri-
gors of the pecuniary loss rule also allows "mitigating" circumstances
to be taken into account.9" Although this phrase has been construed
in other jurisdictions, no judicial construction of the term appears to
have been rendered in Missouri in the context of the wrongful death act.
One of the circumstances which might appear "mitigating" to the
wrongful death defendant is when the widow of the deceased remarries
a person far more affluent than the deceased. In this situation, the plain-
tiff's pecuniary loss is in fact a pecuniary gain. While England,
faithful to the bloodless bookkeeping imposed by the Court of Ex-
chequer, takes this circumstance into account,9a the majority of Amer-
ican jurisdictions reject the notion that a propitious remarriage should
93. See MAI Nos. 10.01 (willful, wanton or malicious misconduct), 10.02 (con-
scious disregard for others). The courts have generated a variety of characterizations
of the culpable conduct necessary to the award of punitive or exemplary damages, but
none of these identifies the culpability level with any real precision. See Mills v.
Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 17 (Mo. App. 1971).
94. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1969). MAI No. 6.01. The Supreme Court Com-
mittee has supplied no cases or serious commentary concerning the circumstances un-
der which the giving of an instruction authorizing consideration of "mitigating cir-
cumstances" might be appropriate. Two intermediate appellate decisions dealing with
the predecessor of present § 537.090 (1969) suggest that "mitigating circumstances"
are relevant only in the event that the petition alleges "aggravating circumstances" and
may not be used to reduce the level of recovery to a point below the actual pecuniary
losses of the statutory beneficiaries. Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544 (1883), afld on
reh'aring, on other grounds, 90 Mo. 403, 2 S.W. 305 (1886); Gilfillan v. McCrillis,
84 Mo. App. 576 (1900).
95. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252, 259 (1963). See also Curwen v. James, [1963]
2 All E.R. 619 (C.A.) (widow's damages reduced when remarriage occurred after trial
but before appeal); Meade v. Clarke Chapman & Co., [1956] 1 All E.R. 44 (C.A.)
(appropriate to reduce damages payable to widow when there is remarriage, but reduc-
tion of damages to dependent child is error because step-father, despite evidence of
love and affection, was under no legal responsibility to support).
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reduce the plaintiff's recovery, and Missouri has refused to consider
such a remarriage a mitigating circumstance.90 Resourceful counsel for
the defendant may, of course, seize upon a number of devices through
which the finder of fact may be indirectly apprised of a remarriage,
although not necessarily stating that such remarriage has conferred
upon the plaintiff a better economic status than previously enjoyed. Per-
haps the least subtle of such devices is to ask, during the preliminary
examination of jurors to determine competence, whether the prospec-
tive juror is acquainted with the plaintiff, Mrs. Warbucks ("Warbucks"
being the surname of the plaintiff's new husband.) Since the name of
the deceased will soon be revealed during the course of the trial, the
jurors will have indirect notice of the widow's economically advan-
tageous remarriage. In a heroic attempt to foreclose this gambit, plain-
tiffs counsel in a recent wrongful death action sought a writ of prohibi-
tion to prevent the trial judge from permitting such questioning of the
jurors which would advert to the remarried name of the plaintiff's wi-
dow, but the writ was denied.9 7
Attention will later be given to the question whether the wrongful
death action is congruent with the tort action for personal injuries. That
is to say, in every case in which the defendant would be liable to the
plaintiff in tort, will he be liable, in the event of the victim's death, for
wrongful death?9 At this point, however, it is appropriate to note that
with regard to punitive damages the wrongful death action arguably is
more liberal than the normal tort action. The wrongful death claim-
ant may recover the substantial equivalent of punitive damages even
though the pecuniary loss rule forecloses recovery of the non-pecuniary
losses associated with the ordinary negligence case, losses sometimes
denominated as "generals." 9  Although not labelled "punitive dam-
ages," the aggravating circumstances which the Missouri statute per-
mits to be considered in the trial of a wrongful death case allow the
96. Platt v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 12 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. App. 1929).
97. Glick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1968). In the foregoing
case the Kansas City Court of Appeals noted that it would not necessarily be improper
to show the remarriage of a widow but that evidence of the circumstances of the re-
marriage probably should not be shown. Id. at 23, citing Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255,
245 A.2d 177 (1968) (leading case qualifying the rule that the remarriage of a widow
may not be shown).
98. See notes 148 and 149 infra and accompanying text.
99. C. GREGoRY & H. KALvEN, CAsEs AND MATERrALS ON TORTS 463 (2d ed.
1969).
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recovery of damages which are, for all practical purposes, indis-
tinguishable from punitive damages.' 00 The advantage to the wrongful
death claimant is that the damages are not called "punitive." Thus, the
wrongful death claimant does not have to meet the technical require-
ments otherwise imposed by the Missouri case law for the recovery of
punitive damages.' These cases hold, for example, that in the normal
tort case, when the plaintiff alleges conduct sufficient to support a claim
for punitive damages, such plaintiff may not proceed on a negligence
theory and is governed by principles applicable to the commission of a
"wanton tort."', Thus, in an automobile personal injury case, the plain-
tiff, if he wishes punitive damages, may not cast his petition in negli-
gence, which means that he may lose the treasured "highest degree of
care" instruction.': Although it is arguable that the plaintiff may
submit alternative theories of recovery,10 4 it should be noted that when
the action is for wrongful death, no such prejudicial distinction in theo-
ries need be made.'"5
100. See, e..., Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36, 42 (Mo. 1962).
101. Id. at 41; Spalding v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37, 206 S.W.2d 517 (1947).
102. See, e.g., Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. App. 1970); Nichols v.
Bresnahan, 357 Mo. 1126, 1130, 212 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1948). Accord, Harzfield's
Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 116 F. Supp. 512, 514 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
103. Nichols v. Bresnahan, 357 Mo. 1126, 1130, 212 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1948).
104. The Springfield Court of Appeals, while holding that in the case before it on
appeal the instructions commingled tort theories which disproved one another, also
conceded that ". . . they are not necessarily discordant." Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d
289, 291 (Mo. App. 1970). The Missouri Supreme Court has refused to pass upon the
question on the ground that since the jury had obviously disbelieved the claim for
punitive damages based upon willful and wanton misconduct, the error, if any, was harm-
less. Brown v. Payne, 264 S.W.2d 341 (Mo. 1954).
105. Glick v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965); May v. Brad-
ford, 369 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1963); Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36 (Mo.
1962). When contributory negligence of the deceased is conceded by a petition relying
upon the so-called "humanitarian doctrine" (Missouri's characterization of the "last
clear chance" rule) logic would indicate that the petition should be dismissed by virtue
of Missouri Revised Statute § 537.085 (1969), which makes the contributory negligence
of the deceased a defense, and which implicitly overrules the case law exceptions
based upon so-called "humanitarian negligence." Logic does not prevail, however, and
it is possible to employ the so-called "humanitarian negligence" theory and thereby
overcome the deceased's contributory negligence in a wrongful death case. See, e.g.,
Krause v. Pitcairn, 350 Mo. 339, 167 S.W.2d 74 (1942). Whether, conceding the
deceased's contributory negligence, the plaintiff who submits on a so-called "humani-
tarian" theory may still receive an instruction authorizing the jury to take into ac-
count the aggravating circumstances, would not seem doubtful in view of the fact that
the so-called "humanitarian doctrine" presupposes a higher degree of culpability than
that embraced by conventional negligence theory. The exact point was passed upon
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Example 17: Plaintiff is seriously injured by a car operated by a drunken
driver. To obtain punitive damages, plaintiff must characterize the de-
fendant's behavior as wilful and wanton, and risk a failure to persuade
the jury on that point. If plaintiff submits his case on negligence, he loses
the right to punitive damages, but obtains the very favorable "highest de-
gree of care" instruction. While he may probably submit, in the al-
ternative, disjunctive theories of recovery, he runs a slight risk that his
evidence of "wilful and wanton misconduct" may be ruled to contradict
evidence of "negligence," and that therefore neither theory can stand
alone as required by Missouri Approved Instruction No. 1.02, and he
has reversible error. 0 6
Example 18: Deceased is killed by a drunken driver. The plaintiff,
statutory beneficiary, may introduce evidence of aggravating circum-
stances, ask for additional damages on that basis, and still obtain a "high-
est degree of care" instruction.' 07
In conclusion a final point deserves emphasis. If the conduct of the
defendant in a wrongful death case would not have permitted an award
of punitive damages in a normal tort action, damages over and above
those related to pecuniary loss may not be recovered under the aggra-
vating circumstances condition of the wrongful death action. 10 8
CAUSATION PROBLEMS
Whether a particular wrongful act is, in fact, a cause of death is
an evidentiary problem which can assume complex proportions. 00
When medical testimony is required, as is often the case, the plaintiff
is faced with the need to reassure his medical expert that he is not com-
promising his profession if he testifies with "reasonable medical cer-
tainty" that something was the cause of the death." 0
and approved in Grothe v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 460 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1970); Spald-
ing v. Robertson, 357 Mo. 37, 206 S.W.2d 517 (1947). A headnote published by the
West Publishing Company erroneously asserts that such an instruction is improper.
See Barnes v. Jones, 306 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1957) (headnote 3 not supported by text
of decision at 516).
106. Ervin v. Coleman, 454 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. App. 1970).
107. E.g., Hertz v. McDowell, 203 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Mo. App. 1947), aff'd, 358
Mo. 383, 214 S.W.2d 546 (1948).
108. Contestible v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1962).
109. See, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Edgeworth, 214 So. 2d 579 (Miss. 1968)
(suicide resulting from hounding by creditors, a justice of the peace, and collection agen-
cies held actionable). Contra, Wallace v. Bounds, 369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1963).
110. James v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 364 (Mo. 1966). The cases on
the application of the "reasonable certainty" rule in Missouri are reviewed and analyzed
[Vol. 1973:327
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Appellate judges are occasionally presumptuous enough to reverse
jury verdicts on the theory that the evidentiary basis for attributing the
death to the defendant's wrongful act is insufficient."' Absent a criti-
cal constitutional issue, there is little recourse from such an arrogation
of authority from the trier of the fact, but this is a problem common to
our legal system and not unique to the action for wrongful death." 2
One causation problem which is unique to the action for wrongful
death arises in states, such as Missouri, where the survival action is barred
if the injured party dies from the wrongful act of the tortfeasor. Ex-
amples 1 and 2 illustrate how this rule operates. What makes the
problem unique is that, since the survival action is different from the
wrongful death action, a decision in one is not res judicata with respect
to the issues in the other.
Example 19: X is in a car accident and dies three weeks later. During
those three weeks X accumulates substantial claims for loss of earnings,
pain and suffering, and medical and hospital expenses. Some question
exists over whether X died from injuries in the crash or from a pre-exist-
ing aneurism. X's personal representative, proceeding on the theory
that X died from the aneurism and not from injuries sustained in the ac-
cident, sues and recovers for damages which the deceased sustained
during the three weeks before death. Thereafter X's widow sues the
same defendant for damages for wrongful death. The defendant
moves to dismiss on the theory that the earlier action by the personal
representative which resulted in a recovery for the personal representa-
tive established that the deceased did not die as a result of the defend-
ant's wrongful act. The motion to dismiss is denied. There is no
collateral estoppel and the factual finding as to cause of death in the
first action is not res judicata insofar as the widow is concerned." 3
Missouri statutes prohibit recoveries for both wrongful death and the
damages which the deceased had sustained before death. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that even in the unique situation hypothesized in
Example 19 duplicate recovery of damages does not result except to
in Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Ser. Co., 362 Mo. 640, 658-59, 243 S.W.2d 92, 97-98
(1951). See Small, Cause, A Many Splendored Thing, in N.A.C.C.A., WRONGFUL
DEATH & SURvIVoRsin, 41 (1958).
111. Sce Bailey v. Kershner, 444 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1969), noted in 36 Mo.
L, Rrv. 127 (1971).
112. See, e.g., Houghton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 446 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. 1969),
noted in 36 Mo. L. REv. 586 (1971).
113. Harris v. Goggins, 363 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. App. 1962), modified and affirmed,
374 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1963); cf. Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Mo. 1966).
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the extent that the Missouri law allows the medical expenses of the de-
ceased incurred prior to death to be recovered by the husband, in the
event that the deceased is a married woman. The unusual result illus-
trated by Example 19 is not that duplicate damages are recovered,
but that the arbitrary policy of the statute, which annihilates the sur-
vival action if the deceased in fact dies of the injuries inflicted by the
tortfeasor, is defeated by a procedural rule. Today, in Missouri, a
defendant faced with the danger of being held liable to both the personal
representative and the statutory beneficiary designated by the wrongful
death statute may bring an action of interpleader to resolve this prob-
lem.1 1 4
It should be pointed out, however, that since the cause of action for
wrongful death does not begin to run until the death of the person in-
jured, it is theoretically possible for an injured person to recover in a
tort action maintained in his own right during his lifetime, and for the
statutory beneficiary to recover in an action for death brought subsequent
to the injured person's death." 5
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The limitation period applicable to the action for wrongful death may
differ considerably from that applicable to a conventional negligence
suit. First, it may be considerably shorter. In Missouri, the period of
limitation applicable to the ordinary negligence action is five years.' 10
The wrongful death action, on the other hand, must be brought within
at least two years from the date of death," 7 and, as will be shown, in
most instances the limitation period is in fact only one year." 8 Sec-
ondly, the limitation may commence in a wrongful death action when it
normally would not run in a negligence case. If the legislature au-
thorizes the maintenance of an action for damages and prescribes a
114. See Smith v. Preis, 396 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1966). See also Wallace v. Bounds,
369 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1963), for an example of the rule requiring an election between
the wrongful death action and the survival action.
115. Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922); Rowe v.
Richards, 32 S.D. 66, 142 N.W. 664 (1913) (dictum), overruled ht part, Ulvig v.
McKennan Hosp., 56 S.D. 509, 229 N.W. 383 (1930). See Bauer, Settling a Death
Case-Watch Out!, 20 J. Mo. BAR 356 (1964). The majority rule, however, is that
the recovery by decedent during his lifetime bars the wrongful death action. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Union Carbide Corp., 415 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1969).
116. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (1969).
117. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.100 (1969).
118. See notes 125 and 126 infra and accompanying text.
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limitation period within which that action must be maintained, it is fre-
quently said that the limitation period is a "built in" period."19 The
characterization "built in" is used in order to emphasize that the limi-
tation period which one would otherwise expect to apply to the action
and to control is not applicable.
In Missouri, where the limitation period is "built in," it has been held
that the tolling provisions which normally suspend the running of the
generally applicable statute of limitations do not apply.J 20  This follows
from a logical interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions and
from the case law. The effect is to allow the statute of limitations to
run on the wrongful death action under circumstances in which the
limitation would ordinarily be suspended.
Example 20: Defendant negligently causes the death of plaintiffs de-
ceased, but fails to report the accident. Despite a diligently pressed
search, over two years elapses before the plaintiff is able to locate and
identify the defendant. Plaintiff's suit is barred, even though, had he
lived, the deceased would have been able to maintain a negligence ac-
tion against the same defendant at any time during a five year period
subsequent to the location and identification of the defendant.1
2
'
A third problem which can arise is peculiar to those jurisdictions
which designate a period of time in which certain preferred beneficiaries
may sue, and, in the event that none of such beneficiaries sues, pre-
scribes an additional and subsequent period within which other bene-
ficiaries may sue. The language of the Missouri statute exemplifies
the legislation of such jurisdictions. 22  Following a provision which
designates the spouse or minor children as the persons having standing
to maintain the action for wrongful death, the statute continues:
(2) If there be no spouse or minor children or if the spouse or minor
children fail to sue within one year after such death . . . , then by
the father and mother .... 1.
119. Davis, Tort Liability and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. Rv. 171, 177
(1968).
120. Smile v. Lawson, 435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1969); Laughline v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.
2d 308 (Mo. 1969); Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958); Baysinger v.
Hanser, 355 Mo. 1042, 199 S.W.2d 644 (1947).
121. Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958), noted in 24 Mo. L. Rav. 397
(1959); 35 N. DAK. L. REV. 171 (1959). See Comment, First Catch Your Defendant
-Limitation and the Unknown Tortfeasor, 29 MODERN L. Rv. 366 (1966).
122, Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(1), (2) (1969).
123. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080(2) (1969).
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Elsewhere, the statute provides as follows:
Every action instituted under section 537.080 shall be commenced
within two years after the cause of action shall accrue. 124
A reasonable interpretation of this statutory scheme is that the legisla-
ture intended to permit an action for wrongful death to be maintained
by anyone entitled to maintain such an action within two years after
the death of the deceased, but that when the deceased is married, or has
children, the parents of the deceased may not maintain the action unless
the spouse or children fail to begin the action themselves within one
year of the decedent's death.
The reasonable interpretation is not, however, the one adopted by the
Missouri courts. The Missouri Supreme Court has twice held that the
failure of the wife to sue within the period equal to one half of the
normal statutory period (six months under the pre-1967 law, but one
year today) bars her action when there is an alternative beneficiary
who wishes or is qualified to maintain the action. 125  In Missouri,
therefore, it is wrong to assume that the two-year limitation spelled out
in the statute applies. This is a trap for those unfamiliar with the stat-
ute. In most instances the effective limitation period is only one year.
Example 21: Defendant negligently causes the death of the deceased,
who leaves a wife and child. One year and three months following
deceased's death, the widow files an action for wrongful death. Two
years and two days following the date of death, the widow's action is dis-
missed. The statute has run and no recovery can be made. 26
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act adopts the substantive law
of the jurisdiction in which the tortious act occurs to determine the avail-
ability of relief and the measure of damages, 27 it is well established
that federal law determines when the cause of action accrues and what
is the period within which action must be brought. 28 Thus, in an ac-
124. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.100 (1969).
125. Uber v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 441 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. 1969); Forehand v. Hall,
355 S.W.2d 940 (Mo. 1962). See also Deming v. Williams, 321 S.W.2d 720 (Mo.
App. 1959). But see Almcrantz v. Carney, 490 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1973); Montemayor
v. Harvey, 490 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1973).
126. Example is based upon facts and law announced in the cases cited in note 125
supra.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970) establishes the basic limitations period of two
years. The statute has been construed to require a federal test for determining the time
at which the tort action against the federal government accrues and, in the case of an
action for wrongful death, this has been construed to be the date of death. Kington v.
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tion against the United States for wrongful death, under the circum-
stances hypothesized in Example 21, the widow's suit would not be dis-
missed, even though the tortious act which resulted in death occurred in
Missouri.1"9
Since under both federal and Missouri law the statute begins to run
from the date of death, no conflicts are encountered in this respect, but
in a jurisdiction which measures the limitations period from the date of
the injury, the federal rule would be potentially less limiting.-30
On logical grounds, it is difficult to justify the establishment of a
special limitation period applicable exclusively to the action for death.
Not only is it a trap for the unwary,'' but it has been the source of
considerable litigation.
CONTRIBUTORY FAULT
Most wrongful death statutes provide that the contributory negligence
of the deceased bars the action. Some statutes accomplish this result
by providing that an action for damages for wrongful death may not be
maintained if the deceased would not have been able to recover damages
for personal injury had he lived." 2 In addition, Missouri simply pro-
vides that the contributory negligence of the deceased may be pleaded
and proved by the defendant as a defense.' 33  In the few remaining
jurisdictions which today require the plaintiff to assume the burden of
pleading and proving freedom from contributory negligence in the nor-
United States, 396 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960 (1969) (widow's
death claim barred because brought later than two years following the deceased's death,
although within two years from discovering that deceased's death was attributable to
negligence of federal employee), noted in 1968 DuKE L.J. 1202.
129. Young v. United States, 184 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
130. Jurisdictions which provide that the statute of limitations begins to run from
the date of the injury rather than from the date of death include Connecticut, Iowa and
Massachusetts. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-555 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 614.1 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 222, § 2 (Supp. 1972).
131. The statutory language is unambiguous. "Every action instituted under section
537.080 shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall accrue.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.100 (1969). When one considers that the vast majority
of wrongful death claims are, under technical interpretations of another provision of
the law, barred after only one year, it is difficult to imagine a situation more likely to
mislead. See note 125 supra.
132. See SPEISER 411; Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for
Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TUL. L. REv. 386, 396 (1942).
133. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.085 (1969). Missouri appears to be the only jurisdiction
in the common law world with a specific provision permitting the contributory negli-
gence of the deceased to be proved as a defense.
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mal negligence action, an exception is typically made when the suit is for
wrongful death,134 because of the obvious disabilities which such a rule
would impose upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff in the wrongful death
case ordinarily was not present when the events occurred and is, for this
reason, hardly in a position to offer evidence as to the absence of con-
tributory fault in the deceased.
In Missouri the burden as to contributory negligence is on the defend-
ant, as it is in most jurisdictions.135  Thus, the need to make a special
exception for death cases is not present. But Missouri very clearly pro-
vides that the contributory negligence of the deceased will bar an ac-
tion for wrongful death, and the statutory scheme underscores this point
by adopting both of the two statutory modes referred to above.
Missouri Revised Statute section 538.080, which creates the cause
of action, explicitly limits the action to those situations when the
negligence is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action. 36 If the party injured had been
134. New York, by statute, has provided that in wrongful death cases the burden of
pleading and proving the contributory negligence issue is on the defendant. N.Y.
DEcE.. EST. LAw § 131 (McKinney 1964). Illinois, by judicial decision, has ruled that,
although there is no presumption of due care which operates in favor of the deceased,
when there are no eyewitnesses to the accident evidence as to the deceased's "careful
habits" is admissible. This means that a jury verdict for the plaintiff will be upheld
even though the only evidence to support the deceased's freedom from contributory
negligence happens to be circumstantial evidence based upon testimony as to careful
habits. Note, however, that such evidence is inadmissible if there are eyewitnesses to
the accident. See Johnson v. Livesay, 29 Ill. App. 2d 428, 173 N.E.2d 838 (1961);
Thompson v. Bailey, 17 Ill. App. 2d 291, 149 N.E.2d 655 (1958). But see National
Bank of Mattoon v. Hanley, 20 Ill. App. 2d 191, 155 N.E.2d 318 (1959), holding that
in the absence of eyewitnesses to the accident the deceased was to be regarded as
having done everything necessary to prevent her death. The presumption of due care
on the part of the deceased when there are no eyewitnesses was a rule originally gen-
erated in Iowa, but now anachronistic by virtue of a 1965 change in the Iowa law mak-
ing the contributory negligence issue an affirmative defense. See SPEisnR 697. The
difference between the practice in Illinois and the old Iowa "no eyewitness rule" may
be more academic than real. See Gulf, M. & C.P.R. Co. v. Larkin, 307 F.2d 225, 228
(8th Cir. 1962).
135. Thompson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 451 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1970); W.
PRossER, LAw OF ToRTs 416 (4th ed. 1971).
136. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1969). This language, which appears in a major-
ity of the wrongful death statutes, and which conditions the existence of the new cause
of action on the hypothesis of a cause of action having originally vested in the de-
ceased, is taken directly from the original English statute. See Fatal Accidents Act of
1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (". . . is such as would [if Death had not ensued] have en-
titled the Party injured to maintain an Action . . .")
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guilty of contributory negligence, he would not have been able to main-
tain an action, and, therefore, no action could be maintained for his
wrongful death. But apparently, just to make the point absolutely clear
Missouri Revised Statute section 537.085 laconically asserts:
On the trial of such actions to recover damages for causing death, the de-
fendant may plead and prove as a defense that such death was caused
by the negligence of the deceased.Y3 7
A more difficult question, however, is presented by the situation in
which the beneficiary of the relational action is himself guilty of neg-
ligent conduct bearing a causal relation to the death of the deceased.
Since the action is not derivative but relational, this type of negligence
is truly "contributory," whereas the negligence, if any, of the deceased
is not really contributory but concurring. 13 8 Put in prosaic terms,
if the gravamen of the wrongful death claimant's cause is (as it must
be under conventional Lord Campbell Act theory) the destruction of the
claimant's "money-making machine," then the participatory fault of
the "money-making machine" itself must be viewed as "concurring"
rather than "contributory" negligence. In other words, if analyzed log-
ically, when both the breadwinner and a named defendant are negligent
in bringing about the death of the breadwinner, insofar as the plaintiff's
pecuniary losses are concerned, the two of them are "joint tortfeas-
ors."
But, as we are frequently reminded, the basis of the law is experi-
ence, not logic. For this reason, the negligence of the deceased, which
logically ought not to bar the innocent beneficiary if, in fact, there is
negligence in a third-party, is generally regarded (with the important ex-
ception to be noted) as a bar to the action."3 9 On the other hand, the
statutes rarely prohibit the causally negligent beneficiary from recover-
137. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.085 (1969). See note 133 supra.
138. For an early recognition of the proposition that when the deceased is guilty of
"contributory" negligence he is, insofar as the statutory beneficiary is concerned, a
joint tortfeasor, see Wettach, Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N.C.L. REv.
211, 215 (1938).
139. The original decision holding that the contributory negligence of the deceased
bais the action was Senior v. Ward, 120 Eng. Rep. 954 (Q.B. 1859). For a discussion
of the virtually unanimous acceptance of this notion by the American jurisdictions, see
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1289, 1290 (1956); id. at 130 (Supp.
1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 494 (1965); id., Appendix 401-
403. The e\ception to the rule that contributory negligence of the deceased bars a re-
co ery for wrongful death arises in the area of products liability. See note 147 infra
and accompanying text.
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ing, which, as has been pointed out earlier, is the true example of "con-
tributory" negligence. 140 However, the case law has compensated for
the draftsman's oversight and generally disallows recovery by a bene-
ficiary whose negligence may have been a causal factor in the death
of the deceased.' 4 1
When, however, there are multiple beneficiaries, only one of whom
was guilty of negligence causally related to the death of the deceased,
the action for wrongful death against the negligent third party is not
barred.' 2 Again, some examples may help to illustrate.
Example 22: Deceased's wife and six children were totally dependent
upon deceased for their support. Deceased had refused, "on principle,"
to carry life insurance, and, despite unremitting entreaties from his wife,
had refused, when driving, to bring his vehicle to a halt before nego-
tiating railway crossings. Deceased is killed when his car is struck at a
railway crossing by a train whose engineer was negligently exceeding
the speed limit and who negligently failed to sound a warning on ap-
proaching the crossing. Deceased failed to stop before negotiating the
crossing. Expert testimony establishes that if the train had been within
the speed limit, or if the engineer had sounded a warning, or if the de-
ceased had first come to a halt before negotiating the crossing, death
would not have ensued. No recovery.143
140. See text accompanying note 138 supra; Wettach, supra note 138, at 219 el seq.
See also Frankel v. Burke's Excavating Inc., 223 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1963), hold-
ing that the contributory negligence of the parents barred their actions for wrongful
death in connection with the death of their children, but that survival actions could be
maintained against the allegedly negligent defendants, and that third party complaints
could be served upon the parents, impleading them as potentially responsible defendants,
under a procedure permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors.
141. Slagle v. Singer, 419 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1967); Dye v. Geier, 345 S.W.2d 83 (Mo.
1961). For a discussion of the rule that the contributory negligence of a beneficiary
bars the action for wrongful death as applied in other jurisdictions, see SPnsnn 419
et seq.
142. E.g., Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M. 468, 379 P.2d 765 (1963). A few jurisdictions
continue to "impute" the negligence of one of the multiple beneficiaries to the others
and thereby defeat the action. See SPEisER 429. For an additional example of the
minority view, see Martinez v. Rodriguez, 215 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1968) (wrongful
death action by father for death of child as result of defendant's alleged negligence
barred by the contributory negligence of the mother), noted in 9 ALA. L. Rnv. 126
(1956).
143. Example 22 is supported by Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250, 201 S.W.2d
390 (1947), although the facts have been changed for emphasis. Note, however, that
if the facts support a submission under the so-called "humanitarian" theory (last clear
chance) the plaintiffs would not necessarily be barred. Grothe v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry.,
460 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1970).
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Example 23: Deceased driver and passenger wife were arguing while
deceased was approaching an intersection. Deceased's wife struck him
which prevented him from observing another car which was obviously
going to run a stop sign. Deceased's failure to observe the other car
resulted in a collision causing the death of the deceased. Even though
deceased was free from negligence, the widow cannot recover for wrong-
ful death because of her own negligence.' 4 4
Example 24: Same facts as in Example 23, except that the wife fails to
sue. Deceased's dependent mother sues later than one year but less
than two years after the accident. Deceased's dependent mother may
recover damages for wrongful death.1 4 5
Example 25: Deceased's mother negligently fails to maintain a careful
lookout when making a left-hand turn which requires her to cross two
lanes of a highway on which traffic proceeds in a direction opposite to
that in which the mother was originally headed. Defendant, travelling
at an excessive speed and also negligently failing to maintain a careful
lookout collides with mother's car while attempting to pass a truck. De-
ceased is killed. Deceased's mother may not maintain the action for
wrongful death, but deceased's father may maintain it, and the dam-
ages which he recovers are not diminished in proportion to deceased's
mother's contributory fault. 146
Under a conventional Lord Campbell's Act approach, which condi-
tions the maintenance of the wrongful death action on whether the de-
ceased would have been able to maintain an action for personal in-
juries had he lived, the evolution of new theories of tort recovery would
144. The example is supported by the leading cases of Slagle v. Singer, 419 S.W.2d 9
(Mo. 1967), and Dye v. Geier, 345 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1961), although the facts have been
embellished considerably for the purpose of emphasis.
145. While there are no cases in direct support of the example, the language of the
statute clearly supports such a conclusion, as do the cases which hold that the con-
tributory negligence of one of several or multiple joint beneficiaries does not bar the
maintenance of the action, even though the contributorily negligent beneficiary is a
joint party-plaintiff. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(2) (1969); Note, The Missouri
14rongful Death Statute, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 138; note 146 infra.
146. Facts in example based upon Sanfilippo v. Bolle, 432 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1968).
The rule that the contributory negligence of one of multiple wrongful death beneficiar-
ies does not bar the action or prohibit the contributorily negligent person from par-
ticipating in the award was established in the leading case of Herrell v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W.2d 102 (1929). Some jurisdictions, while holding that the
action is not barred, attempt to prohibit the contributorily negligent beneficiary from
participating in the award. See, e.g., Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M. 468, 379 P.2d 765
(1963). That the contributorily negligent beneficiary may still be a party plaintiff so
long as there is a joint wrongful death beneficiary who is not contributorily negligent
was established in Reynolds v. Thompson, 215 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1968).
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appear, automatically, to be available to the wrongful death claimant.
In Missouri, however, Missouri Revised Statute section 537.085, which
explicitly makes the contributory negligence of the deceased an affirma-
tive defense, raises the question whether the wrongful death action is in
fact coterminous with the expanding boundaries of tort liability.
Example 26: Deceased attempts to remedy a malfunctioning sump pump
while standing on a basement floor which is flooded as a result of the mal-
function. The sump pump is not grounded and deceased is electro-
cuted. In a tort action against the manufacturer or supplier of the sump
pump based upon negligence, the contributory negligence of the person
who attempted to repair a sump pump under those circumstances would
probably bar the recovery of damages for personal injuries. But, if
the action is predicated upon a products liability theory (either under Re-
statement of Torts (Second) 402A or under the appropriate provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code), the contributory negligence of the
injured person is not a bar. But the action for wrongful death is statu-
tory, and the contributory negligence of the deceased is made a defense
by the statute. Somehow, however, the beneficiary in this situation
may recover damages for wrongful death irrespective of the contributory
negligence of the deceased. 147
Another problem, seldom dealt with by judicial decision, is the char-
acterization of the action as being one for "wrongful" death. Suppose,
for example, the death results from conduct which, while tortiously in-
nocent, would generate liability under theories of strict liability,
nuisance, or products liability. Some courts have held that the adjec-
five "wrongful" means what it says, and that even though the deceased
might have been able to recover damages under a products liability
theory had he lived, the death action is based upon a legislatively im-
posed condition of culpability, and the statutory beneficiary under
those circumstances may not recover for wrongful death. 148  The Mis-
souri Supreme Court has rejected this notion, however, and permits
an action for wrongful death resulting from a product defect, without
the need to establish negligence on the part of the manufacturer or
supplier.149
147. Facts in example based upon Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d
362 (Mo. 1969).
148. DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283 (1965).
Accord, Gott v. Newark Motors, Inc., 267 A.2d 596 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Miller v.
Preitz, 442 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 452,
17 So. 2d 791 (1944). Contra, Scbnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195
N.W.2d 602 (1972).
149. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
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FRONTIERS
When two family members die simultaneously as the result of a sin-
gle wrongful act, and one or the other or both would otherwise have
been qualified to bring the wrongful death action for the death of such
other, it would appear that the action passes to the next beneficiary or
class of beneficiaries named under the statute. This problem arises,
of course, only in states such as Missouri where a person other than the
personal representative is normally qualified to bring the action.150
Example 27: A husband and wife are simultaneously killed as the result
of D's wrongful act. Two children survive. Either child or both may
recover damages for the wrongful death of each parent. 5 '
Example 28: Assume in Example 27 that the couple killed is childless,
that the wife's parents are dead, but that a mother of the husband is
still living. Provided some pecuniary loss can be shown, the husband's
mother may sue for the wrongful death of the husband, and the per-
sonal representative of the wife's estate may sue for the wrongful
death of the wife.' ' 2
In Missouri, when two members of the same family die sequentially
as the result of defendant's wrongful act, and the one dying last would
have been qualified to sue for the death of the one dying first, inter-
esting results ensue.
Example 29: A husband and wife are killed as the result of the defend-
ant's wrongful act. The wife is killed instantly, but the husband
lives for three days before succumbing. There are no children but each
decedent is survived by parents. The parents of the husband may sue
for his wrongful death, but it is arguable that at least during the first
year, only the personal representative of the husband may sue for the
wife's death since the cause of action vested in him before his death.'53
150. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080(1)-(3) (1969); see also note 50 supra and accom-
panying text
151. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Oxford, 144 Ark. 966, 970, 298 S.W. 207, 209 (1927);
Tice v. Milner, 308 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1957). Accord, Southeastern Aviation, Inc.
v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
152. Although no case was found involving the specific facts of Example 28, the
results follow from the theory that the cause of action immediately vests, upon death,
in the statutory beneficiary, and if one of the statutory beneficiaries dies simultane.
ously with the deceased, he is, at that time, not a person in whom the cause of action
can vest. Cf. Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957).
153. Under the facts of Example 29 it is arguable that the personal representative
of the husband, rather than his parents, is the only person with standing to sue
under the incredibly ambiguous provisions of the Missouri statutes. See note 66 supra
and accompanying text. The point of the example, however, is that when one spouse
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Example 30: Same facts as in Example 29 except that no action is
brought within one year by the personal representative of the husband
for the wrongful death of the wife. The parents of the wife may then
sue for damages for her wrongful death.154
A method of overcoming prejudicial limitations of state law govern-
ing wrongful death appears to be infrequently considered, and is avail-
able if the death can in some way be related to an act "under color of
state law" which resulted in the "deprivation of . . rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ...5 The
reference is to the federal tort cause of action based upon the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 which was vitalized by the Supreme Court's 1961
decision in Monroe v. Pape."6 Although the circumstances under which
wrongful death can be characterized as coming within the federal stat-
utory formula are concededly limited, in those situations when it is pos-
sible (e.g., wrongful death at the hands of police officers), an escape
from the monetary limitations on recovery imposed by state law is
available.
Example 31: Plaintiff's deceased dies as the result of wrongful acts of
police officers and jailers of State X. Plaintiff can show no pecuniary
loss, is not the person qualified under state law to bring the action, and
the state law limits damages for wrongful death to $15,000. Plaintiff
may recover damages in excess of $15,000 if the circumstances warrant
it under the "federal common law." 15
predeceases another, and both die from the same wrongful act, the statutory bene-
ficiaries of the person who died last have the action for the wrongful death of the per-
son who died last. Day v. Brandon, 394 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Mo. 1965).
154. Although no case was found involving the specific facts of Example 30, the
result clearly follows from the statutory language of Missouri Revised Statute § 537.080
(2) (1969) and the rationale of the cases cited in notes 152 and 153 supra. Again, it
is arguable that upon the failure of the surviving husband to sue, and, after his death,
the failure of his personal representative to sue, that the cause of action is in the personal
representative of the wife. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Although
there have been intervening amendments of the statute, the situation is just as confusing
today, if not more so, as it was at the time an extremely perceptive and analytical
article dealing with these problems appeared. Lewis, Can Two Be Killed As Cheaply
As One?, 22 1. Mo. BAR 368 (1966). Mr. Lewis notes that if the husband's personal
representative sues, the pecuniary loss (that endured by the husband between the time
of the wife's death and his own demise) is likely to be nominal, at best, whereas the
pecuniary losses of the wife's heirs may be substantial. Id. at 371.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
156. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
157. McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1972); Kerr v. Chicago, 424 F.2d
1134 (7th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Brazier v. Cherry,
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Recent developments in the area of conflict of laws indicate that
damages and procedural disabilities of the lex loci delicti may not be
applicable to the wrongful death action when none of the parties has
any substantial nexus with the jurisdiction where the wrong occurred or
when that jurisdiction has no substantial policy interest in the outcome
of the action.1"5
Example 32: Deceased and his statutory beneficiary are residents of
North Dakota, which does not impose a limitation on liability for wrong-
ful death. Defendant's wrongful act occurs in South Dakota, where de-
fendant, although not a citizen of South Dakota, is temporarily a resident
and can be sued. The death resulting from the wrongful act occurs in
Minnesota. Both South Dakota and Minnesota limit the liability of a
defendant for wrongful death. Whether the South Dakota conflicts rule
identifies the place of the injury or the place of the wrong as the proper
law to apply in a case of interstate tort, it is at least arguable that in this
case the South Dakota courts will permit the plaintiff to recover the full
measure of damages because of the North Dakota contacts and the ab-
sence of any substantial South Dakota or Minnesota policy interest in
the outcome of the action.' 5 9
In states such as Missouri, which impose a ceiling on the damages
which a plaintiff may recover for wrongful death, there are virtually no
exceptions to that ceiling when an action is brought under the statute.
However, if there are multiple tortfeasors who would be jointly liable,
there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from executing, for considera-
ation, covenants not to sue one or more of those potentially liable, while
to preserving the right to sue any one of the remaining tortfeasors for
the full statutory amount. In other words, amounts which a plaintiff
may receive from potential joint defendants in return for covenants
not to sue may not be subtracted from the statutory maximum which
he is allowed to recover from the remaining defendant or defendants.
Example 33: Deceased is killed in Missouri as a result of the combined
negligence of a railroad and a trucking company. The widow gives the
railroad a covenant not to sue in return for $10,000. The widow may
293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); Perkins v. Salafia, 338 F.
Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 1972); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966).
158. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962); Kennedy v. Dixon,
439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONrlC'rs § 175
(1971).
159. Merchants Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D.
1967).
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recover up to $50,000 (the statutory maximum) in her lawsuit against
the trucking company.'6 0
It is now fairly well settled in most jurisdictions, including Missouri,
that a pre-natal injury which causes the death of a child subsequent to
its birth, can be the basis of an action for the wrongful death of
the child. 6' Whether the action may be maintained when there is a
destruction of the viable fetus, or when the child is stillborn, is a mat-
ter upon which the jurisdictions disagree.'162 Those who are opposed to
abortion are quick to point out the inconsistency of permitting abor-
tions while permitting a tort action for the wrongful death of a child
en ventre sa mere.'63 The issue has been presented in Missouri, but
the Missouri Supreme Court found that it did not have to resolve the
question because of the absence of any apparent pecuniary loss to the
statutory beneficiaries. 64
CONCLUSION
About the only present unifying trend is the development of a "federal
common law" with respect to admiralty actions and to death actions
comprehended by the limited federal tort remedy under the 1871 Civil
Rights Act.165 Because of its explicit adoption of state standards, even
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act are fragmented.06
160. Crowder v. Gordon Transports, Inc., 419 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1969). But
note that acceptance of compensation from a joint tortfeasor in return for a covenant
not to sue may be shown by the sued defendant as relevant to the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by the plaintiff, and, in the event that amount received is equal to
or exceeds such pecuniary loss, and there are no other bases for the award of damages,
an instruction authorizing the jury so to find if the evidence so supports is not error,
and a verdict for the defendant will be upheld. Greenwood v. Wiseman, 305 S.W.2d
474 (Mo. 1957).
161. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953). The
literature on the right of the parents to recover for the wrongful death of child injured
when en ventre sa mere is enormous. For a summary, see SPEiSER 352 et seq.; id. at
67 (Supp. 1972).
162. See SPnisER 352 et seq. Compare Simmons v. Howard University, 323 F.
Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971), with Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 3 Ill. App. 3d 422,
279 N.E.2d 440 (1972). See Comment, Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus,
7.HoUSTON L. Rv. 449 (1970).
163. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child, 46 NoTE DAME LAw. 349 (1971).
164. Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Mo. 1965).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 157 supra and accompanying text. The
recognition of a federal common law right of action for wrongful death may have a
similar unifying effect. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
166. E.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). See also D. ScHWARTZ &
S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 213-16 (1970).
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As the text indicates, the much-amended Missouri statute retains a
number of inexcusable anomalies and ambiguities which are extremely
costly to both taxpayers and litigants. In 1971 the Missouri Bar ap-
proved a revised Wrongful Death Act. The Act was introduced during
the second regular session of 76th Missouri General Assembly by Rep-
resentative Martin, but was not passed. That Act is appended here.
1 67
The major changes which the revisions would accomplish are as fol-
lows:
(1) Any or all of the statutory beneficiaries would be allowed to
join in the suit for wrongful death.168 Although the proposed bill
does not cure all the problems encountered in the settlement of a
death case, it does remove the present law's ambiguities with respect
to adult children, both as beneficiaries and as decedents, and rein-
forces the reliability of a settlement by requiring judicial approval.' 69
The bill also does away with the statute of limitations trap under
which an action can be barred after one year, even though the limita-
tion period is two years;170
(2) The monetary limitation on the amount which may be
awarded is removed;171
(3) The limitation on the recovery of damages imposed by com-
pliance with the "pecuniary loss" rule is repealed;'
72
167. Summaries of the major differences and policy thrusts of the various wrongful
death statutes are available in at least one loose-leaf service and a recent major treatise.
CCH AUTOMOBILE L. REP.: T 1925 (1970); S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH (1966). The genesis of the Wrongful Death Statute approved by the Missouri
Bar [hereinafter cited as Proposed Bill], reproduced in the appendix infra, was the
appointment, in the Spring of 1969, of two subcommittees of the tort law committee of
the Missouri Bar to study the problem. One subcommittee was located in Kansas City
and consisted of Thaddeus McCanse, Chairman; A. Warren Francis; Duke Ponick, Jr.;
Phillip Waisblum; and Lawrence Ward. The other subcommittee was headquartered
in St. Louis and consisted of Professor (now Judge of the St. Louis Court of Appeals)
Joseph Simeone of the St. Louis University School of Law, Chairman; Professor Fred
Davis of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; James Hullverson; and
Daniel Rabbitt. During 1969-1970, these two subcommittees did a considerable
amount of analysis, study and consultation. In the Spring of 1970, a new subcommittee
of the tort law committee of the Missouri Bar was appointed to wrap up the project and
consisted of Professor Fred Davis, Chairman, Daniel Rabbitt, Robert Inman, Carl
Sapp, and Professor Joseph Simeone. After a considerable niunber of meetings and
drafts, the Proposed Bill was approved by the Missouri Bar.
168. Proposed Bill § 537.080 and comments following.
169. Proposed Bill § 537.095(1) and comments following.
170. Proposed Bill § 516.140 and comment following.
171. Proposed Bill § 537.090 and comment following.
172. Id.
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(4) All the tolling provisions on the general statute of limitations
are made applicable to the wrongful death action as well as to other
tort actions; 173
(5) fllegitimacy is abolished as a bar to recovery by a child for a
parent's death and vice-versa;174
(6) In a wrongful death action, funeral expenses and damages
sustained by the deceased between the time of injury and the time of
death are recoverable; 175
(7) The implication of the present statute (which is not supported
by case law) that an adult child may not recover for the loss of a
parent or that the parents in an action for the wrongful death of a
child may recover only damages measured by the amount of sup-
port they might have expected from the child during the period of
the child's minority is rejected;' 76
(8) The present doubt whether, in certain cases, the action should
be brought by the parents of the deceased or by the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased is eliminated; 77
(9) In the event that the damages for wrongful death are to be
distributed according to the laws of descent, it provides that the judge
may alter the proportions in order to take into account equitable
considerations. 78
173. Proposed Bill § 516.140 and comment following; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 516.200-
516.300 (1969); Davis, Tort Liability and The Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REV.
171, 177-81 (1968).
174. Proposed Bill § 537.080(1).
175. Proposed Bill § 537.090.
176. Id.
177. Proposed Bill § 537.080(1), (2).
178. Proposed Bill § 537.095(3).
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APPENDIX
Note: Brackets indicate deleted portions of the current statutes and italics
indicate new language.
AN ACT
To repeal sections 516.140, 537.080, 537.085, 537.090, 537.095, 537.100
RSMo 1969 relating to statutes of limitations and actions for death and to
enact in lieu thereof five new sections relating to the same subject.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri as follows:
Section 1. Sections 516.140, 537.080, 537.085, 537.090, 537.095,
537.100 RSMo 1969 are repealed and five new sections enacted in lieu
thereof to be known as sections 516.140, 537.080, 537.085, 537.090, and
537.095, to read as follows:
516.140. Within two years: An action for libel, slander, assault,
battery, false imprisonment, [or] criminal conversation, [.] wrongful death,
and [A]all actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, roentgenologists,
nurses, hospitals and sanitariums for damages for malpractice, error, or
mistake [shall be brought within two years from the date of the act of
neglect complained of, and an]. An action by an employee for the payment of
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated damages
by reason of the nonpayment of minimum wages or overtime compensation,
and for the recovery of any amount under and by virtue of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 and amendments thereto, said act being an act of
Congress, shall be brought within two years after the cause accrued.
COMMENT: Previous wrongful death statutes have prescribed a limita-
tion period different from that set forth in the general statutory pro-
visions on limitations of actions. This has the effect of creating sur-
plusage and denying the normal tolling provisions which in justice are
made available to the plaintiff in other situations. The tolling provision
which extends the cause of action following a dismissal or a "nonsuit"
was made applicable by statute, but again, this was surplusage, Mo. REv.
STAT. § 537.100 being a mere repetition of Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 516.200
and 516.230. The failure of the statute to set forth a tolling provision
for improper acts of the defendant which foreclose the plaintiff from
beginning an action resulted in the unbelievable miscarriage of justice
documented in Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). One
draft proposed by members of this committee would have added an
"improper act" tolling provision to § 537.100. This is fine, as far as
it goes. But it is submitted that it is foolish to handle this matter in a
piecemeal fashion when it is possible to treat, for limitations purposes,
the wrongful death action the same way as any other tort action. For
example, even with the "improper act" tolling amendment proposed by
the earlier draft, which would add to Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.100, the
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action for wrongful death would not be subject to the protections of Mo.
REv. STAT. § 516.250. Thus, if the sole beneficiary of the wrongful
death action should die 23 months and 28 days following the death of
the person with respect to whose death an action was brought, the
action would be barred within two or three days, unless, of course, the
personal representative was instantaneously appointed and, somehow
managed to begin a new action within that period (two or three days).
By amending § 516.140 and repealing § 537.100 another step would be
taken in eliminating the unjust discrimination against families seeking
damages for wrongful death by giving them the same kind of justice
which the law extends to other torts claimants.
If the deceased's death is attributable to medical negligence, undis-
covered until death, but preceding the death by more than two years, it
is arguable that the action is barred under the present wording of §
516.140. It is believed that the present wording of § 516.140 is the
result of a fortuity of draftsmanship which the legislature would never
have adopted had it been aware of the interpretation it would be given
in the cases of Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1969), and
Smile v. Lawson, 435 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1969). See Davis, Tort
Liability and the Statutes of Limitation, 33 Mo. L. REV. 171, 189
(1968). Even if the statute were deliberately framed to produce such
an interpretation, it is manifestly unfair and should be changed. New
York, Kentucky, and Illinois have each, by judicial decision within the
past two years, switched over from the "date of the wrongful act" test
to the so-called "discovery" test. The only argument in favor of the
discrimination resulting under the present interpretations of Mo. REV.
STAT. § 516.140 is that medical people and their insurers are some-
how entitled to special privileges and protections for their wrongful
acts which should not be given to others. Apart from the other grounds
for amendment, the fact that the present wording would bar an
otherwise maintainable wrongful death case arising out of medical
malpractice is sufficient ground for this committee's recommendation.
Since the replacement section for § 516.140 (listing causes of action
which must be brought within two years from the date of accrual) will
include within its listing the action for wrongful death, § 537.100 would
be surplusage and should be repealed. Listing the action for wrongful
death among the other tort actions subject to a two-year statute, it seems
to us, makes more sense than having a special section establishing a
limitation period.
The replacement sections which follow are replacement sections for the
Wrongful Death Act itself.
537.080. Whenever the death of a person [shall be caused by a wrongful
act, neglect or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would,] results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction or circum-
stance which if death had not ensued, would have entitled [the party injured]
such person to [maintain an action and] recover damages in respect thereof,
[then, and in every such case,] the person or party who, or the corporation
which, would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable [to] in
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an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
which damages may be sued for
(1) By the spouse or [minor] children, natural or adopted, legitimate or
illegitimate or by the father or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive;
[either jointly or severally; provided that in any such action the petitioner
shall satisfy the court that he has diligently attempted to notify all parties
having a cause of action under this subdivision; and further,]
[(2) If there be no spouse or minor children or if the spouse or minor
children fail to sue within one year after such death, or if the deceased be a
minor and unmarried, then by the father and mother, natural or adoptive, who
may join in the suit, and each shall have an equal interest in the judgment;
or if either of them be dead, then by the survivor; or if the surviving parents
are unable or decline or refuse to join in the suit, then either parent may
bring and maintain the action in his or her name alone, for the use and
benefit of both such parents; or]
[(3)] (2) [If there be no husband, wife, minor child or minor children,
natural born or adopted, as herein indicated, or if the deceased be an un-
married minor and there be no father or mother, then in such case suit may
be maintained and recovery had by] By the administrator or executor of the
deceased, [and the amount recovered shall be distributed according to the
laws of descent.] if there be no spouse, children, natural or adopted, legitimate
or illegitimate, or father or mother natural or adoptive;
(3) Provided further that only one action may be brought under
this section against any one defendant for the death of any one person.
COMMENT: Although Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969), holds that a wrongful death action may be
predicated upon products liability, there is authority to the contrary.
DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283
(1965). It is still arguable that "wrongful act, neglect or default"
identifies only strictly negligent conduct and does not encompass, for
example, the supplying of a defective product. The proposed change
would make it clear that in every situation when the deceased would
have had an action for damages but for his death, an action can be
maintained for wrongful death when the death results from the same
circumstances which caused the injury. The terms "conduct" and
"circumstances" have been added to the terms of an earlier proposed
draft in order to foreclose any argument that the wrongful death statute
encompasses less liability-producing conduct than normal negligence
and tort liability rules.
The word "party" was added to foreclose an argument that an other-
wise suable defendant (e.g., an unincorporated association) which is not
a "person" or a "corporation" cannot be sued for wrongful death.
The preposition "in" was substituted for "to" because in the legal con-
text "liable to" suggests an obligation to a specific party, which is not
the sense of the particular phrase.
Vol. 1973:3271
Washington University Open Scholarship
372 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
In establishing who may recover, the traditional parties (children and/
or parents) are retained, with the additional identifications of "adoptive"
and "illegitimate." The former designation makes good sense, and the
latter would bring the law into harmony with a number of recent
decisions which disapprove discrimination against illegitimate children.
This status would be relevant to the measure of damages which could be
recovered and it is believed that it is highly unlikely that a jury would
return a sizeable verdict for the parent of an illegitimate child when
such parent had failed to exercise the responsibilities of parenthood.
On the other hand a highly deserving beneficiary would not be fore-
closed because of technical illegitimacy. For an analogous problem
under a pension program involving death benefits, see Adduddell v.
Board of Administration, 8 Cal. App. 3d 243, 87 Cal. Rptr. 268
(1970). See also Levyv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967).
The phrase "for the death of any one person" has been added to fore-
close an interpretation of the "one action . . . against any one
defendant . . ." phrase to allow only one recovery where the defendant,
for example, has simultaneously caused the death of both parents.
The major change, however, is the abandonment of a system of pre-
ferred beneficiaries (spouse, child, parent, personal representative) who
have the power to preempt the action. The 1955 law, which gave
the spouse six months to bring suit and then allowed the children to sue,
had been the subject of much criticism. The 1967 changes allowed
either the spouse or the minor children to initiate the action, and then
passed it on, if they defaulted, to the parents. The 1967 changes,
however, produced a number of uncertainties and ambiguities. Were
the minor children and spouse barred after a year, even though the
statute of limitations is two years? Who sues for the death of an un-
married adult? One interpretation would give that right to the parents,
and another, equally sound, would give it to the administrator or
executor. The proposed change would permit any one of the named
beneficiaries to institute the action (spouse, child, or parent) and, in
the absence of any of these, the personal representative. It is recognized
that adversity between multiple beneficiaries will frequently exist and
that this creates difficulties. However, it is believed that this problem
is inherent in the nature of the action (multiple relational interests in the
deceased with varying degrees of intensity of interest and dependence)
and that it is therefore best to meet it head on, rather than to create an
arbitrary system which may absolutely preempt a deserving beneficiary
in favor of an undeserving one.
Although the proposed change would not solve the problem implicit in
the settlement of a death case, it would simplify it to some extent. The
only way to make settlements uncomplicated while at the same time
retaining some guarantee of fairness among the multiple beneficiaries
is to give the action to the executor or the administrator. This was
the original design of the first Lord Campbell's Act, which was widely
followed. But it was found that this system did not encourage imagi-
native and vigorous pressing of wrongful death tort claims because the
personal representative and his attorney, being concerned with other
aspects of the estate, tended to de-emphasize their significance.
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The requirement that the other beneficiaries be given notice affords
some protection against injustice, and confiding responsibility for the
apportionment of the recovery to the court (Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.095,
infra) affords some protection against a disproportionate award to an
undeserving beneficiary.
Note that the adjective "minor" has been omitted as a modifier of
"child" or "children." The case law never supported the suggestion,
implicit in the use of that adjective, that adult children could not re-
cover for the wrongful death of their parents or that parents could not
recover for the wrongful death of an adult and unmarried child. The
statute should be consistent with the case law in this respect, and the
use of that adjective has caused considerable confusion and ambiguity.
537.085. On the trial of such actions to recover damages for causing death,
the defendant may plead and prove as a defense [that such death was caused
by the negligence of the decased] any defense which defendant would have
had against the deceased in an action based upon the same act, conduct,
occurrence, transaction or circumstance which caused the death of the
deceased, and which action for damages deceased would have been entitled
to bring had death not ensued.
COMMENT: Earlier proposed drafts did not take a position with
respect to Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.085, which specifically preserves the
contributory negligence of the deceased as a defense. Technically,
§ 537.085 is unnecessary since by the explicit terms of § 537.080 an
action for wrongful death may not be maintained if the deceased might
not have maintained his own action for personal injuries had death
not occurred. The proposed revision of § 537.080 would seem to
remove any doubt through the use of the phrase "recover damages"
instead of "maintain an action."
Although, in this sense, § 537.085 has always been surplusage, some
members of the committee believe that it does not hurt to have it
explicitly set forth that the deceased's contributory fault should bar the
action for wrongful death. The only trouble is that the present § 537.085
lists only one of the defenses which the defendant would have had
against the deceased-i.e. "contributory negligence." This inadequacy
would seem to be enough to justify the change. Today, however, there
is additional reason to replace this section. Injuries from defective
products or which result from ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous
activities are frequently held not subject to the strict defense of con-
tributory negligence. Plaintiff's unreasonable conduct may still bar his
recovery, but this conduct must be specifically more culpable than that
which could be classified as mere "contributory negligence." Sometimes
this more culpable conduct is referred to as "contributory fault," or
"assumption of the risk." Other times it is said to be so important in
the chain of events leading to the injury as to amount to a supervening
cause which relieves the manufacturer or seller from liability.
The point is illustrated by the recent Missouri Supreme Court decision
in Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969),
wherein the court clearly indicated that the more relaxed "contributory
fault" test, rather than strict "contributory negligence," would be the ap-
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propriate defense in a products liability case, but did not explain why,
since Keener was a wrongful death case, the explicit statutory provision
of Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.085 did not apply.
The proposed change in § 537.085 would remove all doubt from the
situation and make it clear that the statute and the case law announced
in the Keener decision are in accord.
In addition, the proposed change would make it clear that any defense
which the defendant would have had against the deceased in a personal
injury action brought against him by the deceased would be available in
an action brought against him for wrongful death.
537.090. In every action brought under section 537.080, the [jury]
trier of the facts may give to the [surviving] party or parties [who may be]
entitled [to sue] thereto such damages, [not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,]
as the [court or jury] trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death
and loss thus occasioned, [with reference to the necessary injury resulting
from such death, and] having regard [for the mitigating or aggravating cir-
cumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default resulting in such
death.] to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral ex-
penses, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship,
comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training and support of which those
on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such
death and without limiting such damages to those which would be sustained
prior to attaining the age of majority by the deceased or by the person suffering
any such loss. In addition, the trier of the facts may award such damages
as the deceased may have suffered between the time of injury and the time of
death and for the recovery of which the deceased might have maintained an
action had death not ensued. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending the death may be considered by the trier of the facts but damages
for grief and bereavement by reason of the death shall not be recoverable.
COMMENT: The expression "trier of fact" is offered in replace-
ment of "jury" to cover the situation in which the case, for one reason
or another, is tried to the court, and avoids the ambiguity in the ex-
pression "court or jury" which can be interpreted to mean that in a
case tried before a jury, either the court of the jury may pass upon the
question of damages.
"Party or parties entitled thereto" seems more direct than the phrase
it replaces.
Only seventeen states imposed a monetary limitation in 1935. By
1966 the number was down to twelve. Missouri's sister state of the Mis-
souri Compromise, Maine, removed the limitation in 1965. It is almost
universally conceded that the limitation is unfair, arbitrary, discrimina-
tory and unjust. Except for the legal technicality that the action is
historically a statutory action rather than a common law action, the
limitation probably would have been declared unconstitutional some time
ago. Many think it is unconstitutional in any case. Why wait for the
United States Supreme Court to do our work for us? The limitation
should be removed forthwith.
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"Trier of the facts" is again substituted, for the same reasons set forth
above.
The phrase "with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such
death" seems redundant and ambiguous in view of the proposed changes
which follow.
The phrase "wrongful act etc." is omitted for the same reasons assigned
for omitting those phrases from § 537.080.
The wording which follows is designed to do away with the limitations
of the "pecuniary loss" rule which have been aptly described as "savage."
The rule has no defenders except as an aspect of stare decisis. For a full
discussion of the rule and the reasons why it should be abandoned, see
the opinion in the case of Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich.
1960).
It is recognized that there are difficulties involved in translating the
relational losses of the types identified into dollar terms. This, however,
is no reason for denying recovery. The elements listed are those which
have been judicially identified in decisions not following the strict
pecuniary loss rule. Although general, they provide some standards for
confining the discretion of the jury and, it is submitted, they are a better
pattern than the Georgia rule, which leaves the damages recoverable
to the "enlightened conscience of the jury." A specific limitation is
included which prohibits an award for mere grief or bereavement.
Although there is little precedent for the practice, some decisional law
and the MAI indicate that a child may recover, for the death of a
parent, only the support or contributions he might have received between
the time of death and the time he or she reaches majority. Similarly,
some decisional law and the MAI suggest that when an action is
brought for the death of an unmarried minor by the parents of the
minor, the support which the parents would have received during the
balance of the deceased's minority is the extent of the claim. There
are, however, many cases allowing recovery for the death of an un-
married adult minor where the minor was contributing to the support
of the parents at the time of his death. These cases contradict the
assumption that contributions during minority are the only measure of
damages for the death of a child. The substituted language would make
it a matter of evidence whether it would be likely that such support
would continue after minority-in the case when the parents are killed
as well as in the case when an unmarried minor is killed.
In Missouri the survival of tort claims for personal injuries is explicitly
conditioned upon the circumstance that death occur from something
other than the act for which the tort claim is pressed. Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 537.020. This means that the accrued claims of the injured party for
damages sustained and suffered between the time of injury and the time
of death abate (are forfeited) upon death and the injured party's estate
recovers nothing for his pain and suffering, loss of earnings, medical
and hospital expenses, and special damages of one sort or another,
Moreover, the only item recoverable by the beneficiary in a wrongful
death action-medical and hospital expenses-is recoverable (theoreti-
cally) only if the beneficiary would be legally responsible therefore.
This produces the following absurdity: A husband suing for the wrongful
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death of his wife can recover the medical and hospital expenses incurred
by his wife before her death and arising out of the injury which ultimately
produced her death. But a wife may not recover, in an action for the
wrongful death of her husband, the medical and hospital expenses in-
curred by the husband before death on the technical ground that she is
not legally responsible for them.
The amendment would cure this anomaly and would also repeal the
rule that damages suffered by the deceased are forfeited when he dies
from injuries inflicted by a tortfeasor. Missouri is one of only five juris-
dictions which adheres to this rule. It is less confusing to have these
damages recoverable under a wrongful death action than to permit, as
does New York and some other states, a separate survival action to
recover for injuries actually suffered by the decedent. Also, there is
less danger of separate juries returning overlapping damage verdicts.
Funeral expenses are not logically allocable to either the "survival"
side (the injured party suffered no such expense while alive) or the
"wrongful death" side (everybody must have a funeral at some time)
of the damages issue. All the tortfeasor has done has been to accelerate
the time for payment. Nevertheless, Missouri and some other states
permit funeral expenses to be recovered as part of the wrongful death
damages if the beneficiary would have been legally obligated to pay
them. It seems that if funeral expenses are to be recoverable as part of
the total damages in a wrongful death case, such recovery should not
be contingent upon the beneficiary's legal liability for such expenses.
Funeral expenses are therefore made recoverable without qualification.
It is arguable that the statutory phrase allowing the "mitigating or
aggravating circumstances" to be taken into account (the meaning of
which has never been all too clear-cf. MAI § 6.01 and the absence of
any notes or comments) is surplusage in view of the expanded specifica-
tion of compensable elements proposed by the new draft. Certainly it
is out of place if left in its original position. Some members of the
committee nevertheless believe that the phrase is one to which lawyers
have become accustomed, that some judges believe that the award of
punitive damages is specifically conditioned upon the "aggravating cir-
cumstances" standard, and that it would not hurt to leave the traditional
phrase in the statute. For such reasons the phrase has been retained,
although it has been placed at the end of the paragraph where, because
of the rather general nature of the standards it permits, it seemed more
appropriate to place it.
537.095. 1. Except as provided in subsection 2 of this section, if two
or more persons are entitled to sue for and recover damages as herein allowed,
then any one or more of them may compromise or settle the claim for
damages with approval of any circuit court, or may maintain such suit and
recover such damages without joinder therein by any other person, provided
that the claimant or petitioner shall satisfy the court that he has diligently
attempted to notify all parties having a cause of action under section 537.080
RSMo. Any settlement or recovery by suit shall be for the use and benefit
of those who sue or join or who are entitled to sue or join and of whom the
court has actual written notice.
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2. When any settlement is made by or recovery had by any administrator
or executor on behalf of those persons entitled to damages, any settlement or
recovery by such administrator or executor of the deceased shall be distributed
according to the laws of descent, unless special circumstances indicate that
such a distribution would be inequitable, in which case the court shall
apportion the settlement or recover, in proportion to the losses suffered by
each person or party entitled to share in the proceeds and provided that any
person entitled to share in the proceeds shall have the right to intervene at
any time before any judgment is entered or settlement approved under this
section.
[1.] 3. In any action for damages under section 537.080 [,] the trier
of the facts shall state the total damages found, or upon the approval of any
settlement for which a petition or application for such approval has been filed,
the court shall state the total settlement approved. The court shall then
enter a judgment as to such damages, apportioning them among those per-
sons entitled thereto in proportion to the losses suffered by each as determined
by the court.
[2.] 4. The court shall order the claimant:
(1 ) to collect and receipt for the payment of the judgment;
(2) to deduct and pay the attorneys fees as contracted, or if there is no
contract, or if the party sharing in the proceeds has no attorney representing
him before the rendition of any judgment or settlement, then the court may
award the attorney who represents the original plaintiff such fee for his
services from such persons sharing in the proceeds, as the court deems fair
and equitable under the circumstances [and expenses of recovery and
collection of the judgment];
(3) to acknowledge satisfaction in whole or in part for the judgment and
costs;
(4) to distribute the net proceeds as ordered by the court; and
(5) to report and account therefor to the court. In its discretion the court
may require the claimant to give bond for the collection and distribution.
COMMENT: The first paragraph is new and is designed to ease the
vexing problem of negotiating a settlement which all the parties desire
but which heretofore could offer the defendant and/or his insurer no
assurance that any such settlement would bar all relational claims based
on deceased's death. The assurance of finality which this new section
attempts to give depends on the quality of the diligence exercised by
those settling the claim in giving notice to all parties having a cause of
action or a right to intervene. It was not thought necessary to have
specific language authorizing intervention at any time before approval
of a settlement since it is impossible to imagine a court approving a
settlement while at the same time barring an authorized beneficiary from
participation therein. The final sentence of new subsection 1 states what
is perhaps obvious, but the provision makes clear that the court may not
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make allocations from the settlement or judgment for persons who have
not joined or intervened except, as in the case, for example, of a six
month old child of whose existence the judge will ex necessite be ap-
prised, and whose interest should not be cut off by other claimants.
Subsection 2 is new and is designed to remove any doubt about the
power of the personal representative to recover damages for wrongful
death and to distribute the damages in accordance with the laws of de-
scent. Some members of the committee envisioned situations in which
blind adherence to the laws of descent would produce monstrous injus-
tices (e.g., a disabled cousin whom the deceased was supporting and to
whom the deceased was very much attached could be totally preempted
by a vicious brother who is otherwise independently wealthy). For this
reason a safety valve has been inserted which would permit a court,
under special circumstances, to order a settlement or distribution which
deviates from the normal laws of descent.
Subsection 3 contains two minor additions to the language of the
existing provisions: (a) it requires what the present language fails to
cover-namely, that when a settlement is approved by the court, the
court shall formally state the total settlement approved before distribution
under subsection 4 (the present law requires this only in connection
with an action); and (b) it imposes a requirement previously assumed,
but nowhere made explicit, that the distribution among multiple bene-
ficiaries be in proportion to the losses suffered by each (which, it is im-
portant to note, would permit a court to make a deduction in the situation
where one of the death action beneficiaries was himself causally re-
sponsible in some measure for the injury which produced death).
Subsection 4 is merely a renumbered section from the existing statute
with no change except a provision making it possible to award an ade-
quate fee to an attorney representing a primary claimant whose award is
diminished as the result of the intervention by multiple unrepresented
claimant-beneficiaries.
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